Essays in economics by Ivanov, Andrey V.
Essays in Economics
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universita¨t Mannheim
vorgelegt von
Andrey V. Ivanov
Mannheim 2008
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Grüner 
Referent: Prof. Konrad Stahl, PhD. 
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Eckhard Janeba 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 10. Juni 2008 
For Marina
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank Konrad Stahl for his patience and
guidance over the past 5 years. Without him, I would not have learnt the
“Aha!” feeling of scientific investigation, and this dissertation would not
have seen the light of day.
I am also indebted to Eckhard Janeba, for many illuminating and helpful
conversations about international trade and other general topics.
I would also like to thank, regarding the work in Chapter 2: Bernhard
Boockmann, Markus Fro¨lich, Bernd Fitzenberger, Heiko Karle, Heiner Schu-
macher and Tobias Klein, for helpful suggestions.
Regarding Chapter 3: Heiner Schumacher and the participants of the
CDSE Seminar participants for helpful discussion. And, separately, Alan
Deardorff for discussing thoughts that turned into this project.
Regarding Chapter 4: Martin Peitz, Volker Nocke, Gonzague Vannooren-
berghe, Jennifer Abel-Koch, Johannes Koenen and the CDSE Seminar par-
ticipants for helpful suggestions and discussion.
Regarding Chapter 5: Martin Hellwig, Andreas Irmen (also for many
supportive discussions on other topics), Jean Tirole, Patrick Rey, Jean-
Charles Rochet, Chaim Fershtman, John Panzar, Heiko Gerlach, Tobias
Klein, Heiko Karle, and seminar participants at the Universities of Mannheim
(2004 and 2006), Auckland (2004), and Toulouse (2005).
I would like to thank especially my co-authors, Florian Mu¨ller and Frank
Wachtler for their patient discussions and collaboration.
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank Vladimir Ivanov and
Valeria Ivanova for everything.
And, above all, I would like to thank Marina Mavrodieva-Ivanov for her
comments and suggestions on various versions of my dissertation and for her
ongoing moral support.
Contents
1 Introduction 11
1.1 General introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1.1 Labour market discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1.2 Migration and trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1.3 Free Trade Agreements and third-country welfare . . . 13
1.1.4 “Ineffective” competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Discrimination 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 Kuhn (1987)1 and Garc´ıa et al. (2001) . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Machada and Mata (2005) and Buchinsky (1998,2001) 18
2.2.3 Albrecht and co-authors (2003,2004) . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Wages and the wage gap decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Mean regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Quantile regression (QR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.1 Mean regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.2 Quantile regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 Migration and Trade 55
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1Kuhn [1987] does not use quantile regressions, but the study is related to Garc´ıa et al.
[2001].
7
8 CONTENTS
3.2.1 The migrant story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2 Gravity model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.3 Confounding factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.4 The data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.1 Base regression and the lag question . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.2 Occupations of immigrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.3 Finer trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.4 Confounding factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4 Free Trade Agreements 85
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.1 Two asymmetric countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.2 Three asymmetric countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5 “Ineffective” competition 107
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3.1 Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3.2 Best responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 Empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.2 Testing for negative relationship between prices and
station density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A Appendix to Chapter 3 125
A.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
CONTENTS 9
B Appendix to Chapter 4 129
B.1 Equilibrium under two symmetric countries . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.2 One large and two small countries - calculation of price equi-
libria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B.2.1 Collusive price equilibrium before FTA . . . . . . . . . 133
B.2.2 Competitive price equilibrium before FTA . . . . . . . 134
B.2.3 Price equilibrium after FTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
C Appendix to Chapter 5 141
C.1 Derivation of equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C.1.1 Hinterland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C.1.2 Profit and demand regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C.1.3 Best response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
C.2 Reference cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
C.2.1 One-product monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
C.2.2 Two-product monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
C.3 Chow Test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
10 CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General introduction
This dissertation consists of four self-contained papers, related in spirit by an
interest in applied issues in the economy. There is a certain other connection
between all chapters: Chapter 2 is about immigrants in the German labour
market, Chapter 3 about immigrants and international trade, Chapter 4
about international trade and differentiated products, and Chapter 5 about
differentiated products and abnormal price behaviour.
Each chapter contains a detailed introduction and a literature review;
in what follows immediately, I will only provide a terse descriptions of each
contribution.
1.1.1 Labour market discrimination
In Chapter 2, I investigate wage discrimination of immigrant women in a
German labour market. It is true that immigrant women receive lower
wages than their native counterparts. It is not a priori clear what part of
this wage gap can be attributed to objective labour market characteristics,
such as education.
The part that cannot be attributed to objective labour market char-
acteristics might be called “discrimination”. It is because this part comes
from differences in how the market treats (through wages) each unit of ob-
jective characteristics, and this treatment can be different for immigrants
and natives.
Starting with Oaxaca [1973], there exists a vast literature that attempts
11
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to find out the effective size of this “discrimination”, with the job becoming
more complex when trying to account for sample selection. That is, that
a woman might self-select into the labour force, and we as scientists would
have no way of telling the woman’s outside option (i.e., an offered wage).
This problem and its implications are well presented in Heckman [1979].
In this chapter, I implement various ways to decompose the wage gap
that were developed for OLS regressions, in the context of quantile regres-
sions. That is, instead of looking at the means wage gap, I look at the wage
gap at different quantiles of wage distributions, in the context of German
labour market. Furthermore, I correct for sample selection bias.
One empirical result stands out from this approach: endowment effects
account for almost all of the observed wage gap between the native and
immigrant women in Germany.
My contribution fits into a growing literature that utilises quantile re-
gression approach to study how the wage distribution behaves over time
[e.g., Buchinsky, 1998, 2001, Machado and Mata, 2005] or how the male-
female wage gap behaves across the wage distribution [e.g., Garc´ıa et al.,
2001, Albrecht et al., 2003]. There are only two papers that correct for
selectivity [Garc´ıa et al., 2001, Albrecht et al., 2004], and only one mention-
ing1 the native/immigrant wage gap [Albrecht et al., 2003]. All the papers
concentrate on the gender wage gap. No paper besides Neuman and Oaxaca
[2004] deals in-depth with the native/immigrant wage gap.
1.1.2 Migration and trade
In Chapter 3, I again look at migration. Migration is able to facilitate
international trade through cross-border transfer of information. Migrants
know about their host and home markets, and thus can be intermediaries
to inter-regional trade. In broad terms, the effect of migrants on trade has
been studied before [see, e.g., Rauch, 2001, Wagner et al., 2002]. However,
the results of previous studies are open to different interpretations.
In this chapter, I investigate the intermediary effect of migrants on trade
using the data for Germany on immigrant labour market involvement, to
disentangle alternative explanations for the correlation between migration
and trade. I find evidence for the importance of white-collar over blue-collar
1without decomposition or deeper investigation of any kind
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immigrants, and for products that are relatively more complex, as expected.
However, when trying to control for endogeneity, the size of the coefficients
decreases by up to 16 percent.
1.1.3 Free Trade Agreements and third-country welfare
Staying with the issues of international trade, Chapter 4 looks at the welfare
effect that a Free Trade Agreement between several countries can have on
non-participating countries; this chapter is joint work with Frank Wachtler.
The literature related to the “innocent bystander problem” [Krugman,
1991] predicts that when a subset of countries enters into a free trade agree-
ment (FTA), the rest of the world suffers in welfare. We present a trade
model with horizontally differentiated goods, in which in contrast to the
literature, we show that under some conditions the non-FTA-participating
countries can also gain in welfare. The main drivers behind this positive
result are the size asymmetry of the countries and the inability of firms to
perfectly price-discriminate across countries.
1.1.4 “Ineffective” competition
Chapter 5 is again about horizontal differentiation, in which Florian Mu¨ller
and I show that a duopoly market can have higher equilibrium prices than
a single-product monopoly.
Conventionally, we think of an increase in competition as weakly de-
creasing prices, increasing the number of consumers served, thus increasing
consumer surplus, decreasing firms profits, etc. Here, we revisit the Hotelling
model to discuss how, under some tame circumstances, an increase in com-
petition may lead to a price increase.
More importantly, we show this relationship empirically for the petrol
market in German cities.
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Labour market
discrimination in Germany?
Quantile regression
decomposition of the wage
gap
2.1 Introduction
Suppose that for two groups in the labour market, we observe markedly
different wages (e.g., immigrants and natives). It is possible to decompose
this gap in different ways into the part explained by labour market charac-
teristics (e.g., education, tenure) and the unexplained part [a` la Neuman
and Oaxaca, 2004]. The unexplained part can sometimes be viewed as dis-
crimination.
In this paper, I investigate the possibility of implementing these wage
gap decompositions in the context of wage distributions (via quantile re-
gressions), and I augment the classification of the decompositions given in
Neuman and Oaxaca [2004] with a new way to decompose the wage gap.
Furthermore, I decompose the wage gap of native and immigrant women
in Germany, while taking account of sample selection (selectivity) problem.
One empirical result stands out from all but one decomposition: endow-
15
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ment effects account for almost all of the observed wage gap between the
native and immigrant women in Germany.
There is a growing literature that utilises quantile regression approach
to study how the wage distribution behaves over time [e.g., Buchinsky, 1998,
2001, Machado and Mata, 2005] or how the male-female wage gap behaves
across the wage distribution [e.g., Garc´ıa et al., 2001, Albrecht et al., 2003].
There are only two papers that correct for selectivity [Garc´ıa et al., 2001,
Albrecht et al., 2004], and only one mentioning1 the native/immigrant wage
gap [Albrecht et al., 2003]. All the papers concentrate on the gender wage
gap. No paper, to the best of my knowledge, investigates the multiple
ways to incorporate the differences in selectivity (in the spirit of Neuman
and Oaxaca [2004]) into the quantile regression wage gap decompositions.
No paper besides Neuman and Oaxaca [2004] deals in-depth with the na-
tive/immigrant wage gap.
The following section overviews the related literature. Section 2.3 presents
the theory of the mean and distribution wage gap decompositions, with the
following novelties: section 2.3.1 presents new decomposition, to augment
the four given in Neuman and Oaxaca [2003]; section 2.3.2 provides some
discussion of identification of various decompositions in the quantile regres-
sion context; section 2.3.2 provides the results from implementing own de-
composition with quantile regressions; section 2.3.2 discusses the merits of
selectivity-adjusted decomposition; and the rest of the section 2.3 provides
the known theory of wage-gap decomposition. Section 2.4 describes the
data. Section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 Kuhn (1987)2 and Garc´ıa et al. (2001)
Kuhn [1987] compares the strength of visible and invisible information in
determining discrimination. The visible information comes in the form of
wage information, visible to the outsiders and the basis for statistical studies,
while the invisible information is inferred from the self-reported measure of
discrimination from confidential surveys. This self-reported measure carries
1without decomposition or deeper investigation of any kind
2Kuhn [1987] does not use quantile regressions, but the study is related to Garc´ıa et al.
[2001].
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both types of information, which go into the decision of a person to report
some or no discrimination. The latter type of information is invisible to the
researcher, but visible to the person experiencing it, and may take forms of
on-work attitudes, perks, etc.
Kuhn [1987] finds that if the visible discrimination disappears, the “per-
centage of women with median characteristics who report discrimination”
would fall only by one third (from 15 to 10 percent for Canada, or from 10
to 6 for the US).3
Garc´ıa et al. [2001] pick up where Kuhn [1987] leaves off, trying to rec-
oncile the statistical measures of discrimination with (potential) reported
discrimination by women. Garc´ıa et al. [2001] suggest this can be done with
the help of quantile regressions: their wage equation specification includes
an error due to unobserved characteristics, which can shift the wage above or
below that which would otherwise have obtained due only to observed char-
acteristics. It is assumed that “women with unobserved characteristics that
situate their wage above the expectation of wages based on their observed
characteristics will compare themselves with men whose wage would be situ-
ated above the expectation of male wages conditional on the same observed
characteristics” [Garc´ıa et al., 2001]. This suggests comparing the wages of
women and men at different slices of the wage distribution conditional on
observed characteristics.
The authors estimate their measure of discrimination, which is essentially
the difference in the coefficients attributed to the labour market character-
istics possessed by women. The authors find that at the top of the wage
distribution, the differences in characteristics account for less of the wage
gap than at the bottom of the distribution, which is consistent with the
findings in Kuhn [1987] that women in higher paying positions report more
discrimination.
The authors also account for endogeneity of education and selectivity
into the labour force by women. The authors use the approach of Buchinsky
[2001] for adjustment to selectivity in a quantile regression model. The
selectivity’s contribution to decomposition is treated similar to Selectivity 2
in Neuman and Oaxaca [2004], where the differences due to selectivity are
recorded mostly into the discrimination part.
3There exists a question on the self-reported discrimination in the SOEP dataset that
perhaps could be put to a good use?
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2.2.2 Machada and Mata (2005) and Buchinsky (1998,2001)
Machado and Mata [2005] investigate the wage inequality in Portugal over
time, and which factors contributed to the change in this wage inequality.
More importantly, the authors develop a technique for creating counter-
factual wage distributions with quantile regressions, in order to isolate the
effects of different factors contributing to the wage inequality.
Like Machado and Mata [2005], Buchinsky [1998, 2001] focuses on the
changes to the distribution of (in this case, female) wages and the returns
to education over time. Buchinsky [1998, 2001] develops and applies the
quantile regression techniques with sample selection bias, but does not study
the male-female wage gap. The techniques developed in these papers are
similar in spirit to the procedure of Heckman [1979] as applied in a standard
(mean wage) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition [see, e.g., Neuman and Oaxaca,
2004].
2.2.3 Albrecht and co-authors (2003,2004)
Albrecht et al. [2003] use quantile regressions to investigate how the gen-
der gap differs across the wage distribution in Sweden, and in particular,
whether there is a “glass ceiling” at the top of the distribution for women,
with finding positive answer to this question. The authors apply the tech-
nique from Machado and Mata [2005] to create two counterfactual log wage
densities (the one for female wages with women’s own characteristics but
“paid like men”, and the other for the case in which women were given
men’s characteristics but were still paid “like women”) to decompose the
gender wage gap a` la Blinder-Oaxaca.
For the secondary focus of the paper, Albrecht et al. [2003] look at the
recent immigrants into Sweden and find that the native–immigrant wage
gap is almost constant across the wage distribution.4 However, there is no
decomposition for the immigrants.
Albrecht et al. [2004] apply the Machado and Mata [2005] approach
further by accounting for the sample selection bias, using the techniques
from Buchinsky [1998].
4I find different results for the German labour market.
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2.3 Wages and the wage gap decomposition
2.3.1 Mean regression
This section is essentially a summary of Neuman and Oaxaca [2003].
Consider the following Mincer-style model of earnings with sample se-
lection problem, in matrix notation:
y∗j = Xjβj + uj, (2.1)
yrj = Zjβ
r
j + vj, (2.2)
Dj = I(y
∗
j − yrj > 0)
= I(Zjγj + ej > 0), (2.3)
yj = Djy
∗
j , (2.4)
where y∗j , y
r
j , and yj are the (1×Mj) vectors of (respectively) offered, reserve,
and observed log-wages with j ∈ {N, I} (for natives and immigrants) and
Mj the number of observations in each sample, Xj is the m×Mj matrix of
observed labour market characteristics/endowments that affect the offered
wages (constants included)—these characteristics/endowments are years of
schooling and tenure, for example; Zj is the n ×Mj matrix of all charac-
teristics/endowments that affect the participation in the labour force, with
m < n and Xj ⊂ Zj; Dj is the dummy variable for employment, and I(·) is
the usual indicator function; γj = β
∗
j − βrj , where β∗j = (βj , 0), with zeros
for all those variables in Zj and not in Xj ; vj and uj are the disturbances,
and ej ≡ uj − vj .
The expected value of observed wages, conditional on X, is given by:
E(yj|Xj) = E(y∗j |Xj ,Dj = 1)
= Xjβj + E(uj|Xj , ej > −Zjγj)
= Xjβj + hj(Zjγj),
(2.5)
where the conditional error term is not typically zero, but it is assumed
that E(uj |Xj , ej > −Zjγj) can be represented by a function only of an
index, Zjγj(≡ gj). The joint error distribution is assumed to be normal
with density (0, 0, σvj , σej , ρj) (normalise σej = 1), hj(·) = λj(·)θj , λj ≡
φ(Zjγj)/Φ(Zjγj) is the (Inverse) Mills ratio, where θj ≡ ρjσvj , and φ(·) is
the standard normal d.f. To estimate the parameters of interest β’s, the
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strategy would be to use Heckman’s two-step procedure.5
The decomposition of the log-wage difference for women with selectivity
bias is then:
y¯N − y¯I =
(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN + X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
+
(
λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI
)
, (2.6)
where y¯j is the mean predicted wage, X¯j are the mean values of labour mar-
ket characteristics/endowments, βˆj and θˆj are estimates of the (respectively)
endowment coefficients and the market treatment of the selectivity part of
the equation,6 and λˆj is the mean of the fitted values of the individual Mills
ratios {λˆj,i}, where i is an individual index.
The last term in the equation (2.6) is the selectivity differential. It says
which group of women, on average, is more likely to be employed (λˆj) and
how the market treats this (θˆj).
7 The selectivity differential can then be
treated in a number of ways. First, the wage differential can be adjusted for
selectivity—as in equation (2.7)—and the adjusted wage differential can be
decomposed using the usual Blinder-Oaxaca method.
y¯N − y¯I −
(
λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI
)
=
(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN + X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
. (2.7)
The first part of this decomposition is the part of the wage gap that can
be attributed to the differences in objective labour market characteristics
(such as schooling) of the two groups of women. In particular, this part
asks the question, “assuming the immigrant women’s characteristics were
treated by the market in the same way as the native women’s, how much
does the immigrant women’s characteristics’ difference from those of the
natives contribute to the wage gap?” Of course, the average characteristics’
difference can be either positive or negative: in reality, immigrant women
can be more educated or have longer average tenure. We shall find this out
5The purpose of this project is to compare how various wage-gap decompositions re-
late to each other and to provide a discussion on identification of these decompositions.
Thus, it suffices to choose the simplest estimation technique possible and assume the nor-
mality of errors. However, if the joint error distribution is not normal, we can turn to
Buchinsky [1998] for semi-parametric wage-gap decomposition [using the SLS estimator
from Ichimura, 1993, in the first step of the heckit estimator].
6θˆj is the estimate of ρjσvj
7Strictly speaking, it is the denominator of λj,i that is the probability that “a popula-
tion observation with characteristics Xj,i is selected into sample,” that is, the probability
that a woman with characteristics Xj,i is working [Heckman, 1977].
2.3. WAGES AND THE WAGE GAP DECOMPOSITION 21
in the empirical section.
The second part of the adjusted wage gap is the part of the wage gap
that is not possible to attribute to the endowments, but to the differences
in coefficients of the offered-wage equation.8 This part is typically called
“discrimination”, since in cases that it is not zero, it says that the market
treats one unit of immigrant labour market characteristics differently to one
unit of the same labour market characteristics of the natives.9
Next, the last term in the equation (2.6) can itself be decomposed into a
“human capital/explained” and “unexplained” components in a number of
different ways.
The difference in the means of expected conditional error terms from the
equation (2.5) can be decomposed as:
E¯
(
uN |XN , eN > −µD,N − ZN γˆN
)− E¯(uI |XI , eI > −µD,I − ZI γˆI)
=
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN + λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)
, (2.8)
where λˆ0I is the average of λˆ
0
I,i = φ(ZI,iγˆN )/Φ(ZI,iγˆN ) and i is an individual
index. The term λˆ0I captures how the labour market participation decision
for the immigrant women would look like if they faced the same selection
equation that the native women face.
The first term of this decomposition,
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN , measures the effects
of the migrant differences in the parameters γj on the wage differential.
Remember, γj = β
∗
j − βrj , which means that the γj parameters measure
both how the market treats the people’s observed objective characteristics
and how people treat their own characteristics when choosing if to work,
which is inherently subjective.
The second term,
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN , measures the native–migrant differences
in the variables determining the employment, Zj—this is usually added to
the endowment effect in the final decomposition. The final term, λˆI
(
θˆN−θˆI
)
,
captures the effects of the differences in how the market treats (through the
wages) the probability of employment.
Neuman and Oaxaca [2003] suggest four ways to decompose the wage
8We can call it “the rest”.
9Note, this is only true if in fact one unit of characteristics such as one year of education
is the same across both groups. This may not be the case if the education in question
occured in different countries. I try to account for that by taking only those immigrants
that studied in Germany. I revisit this point when discussing the data.
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differential given in equation (2.6). I shall now diverge slightly from sum-
marising their approach and discuss what to call “discrimination”. Neuman
and Oaxaca [2003] almost always include the differences in the γj parame-
ters into the “discrimination” part. This is inherently problematic, because
the γj parameters measure both differences in the offered-wage equation co-
efficients and reserved-wage equation coefficients. The implicit assumption
that Neuman and Oaxaca [2003] are making is that the differences in the
γj parameters come primarily from the offered-wage equation. This may
or may not be the most appropriate assumption, and I come back to an
alternative assumption in Section 2.3.1.
The upshot of proposing different ways to view discrimination is, then,
that we do not have to decide on what to call “discrimination”, because
every person can decide which decomposition to accept as the proper one,
depending on their own beliefs. However, we have to keep in mind the
implicit assumptions that go into every “discrimination” definition. With
this proviso, I stay close to the definitions of Neuman and Oaxaca [2003] for
the rest of the paper.
The first way to decompose the wage gap is to include the differences in
θj’s in the endowment effect, and the differences in γj ’s into the unexplained
effect. This gives us Selectivity 1:
y¯N − y¯I =(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN + λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment
+ X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
+
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(2.9)
In selectivity 2, the differences in the parameter θj are also relegated to
the unexplained/coefficient part, in addition to Selectivity 1:
y¯N − y¯I =(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment
+ X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
+
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN + λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(2.10)
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Given that the last part of the equation (2.8) reflects the wage-gap effects
of the correlation between the random error terms of the equations (2.4) and
(2.3), it may be best left as a pure “selectivity” effect, as in Selectivity 3:
y¯N − y¯I =(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment
+ X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
+
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
+ λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selectivity
(2.11)
The most agnostic way is to treat all of the selectivity effects as selec-
tivity, as in Selectivity 4:
y¯N − y¯I =
(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment
+ X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
+
(
λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selectivity
(2.12)
Selectivity 5
Here, I depart from Neuman and Oaxaca [2003], and take a closer look
at the coefficients from the selection equation, γj. The differences in these
coefficients between the two groups of women can come from two sources: the
differences in the reserved-wage equation coefficients, and the differences in
the offered-wage equation coefficients. The offer equation coefficients always
reflect the behaviour of the labour market. The reserved-wage coefficients
may reflect cultural preferences and the like.
Assume that it is the differences in the reserved-wage coefficients that
drive the differences in γj’s. In this case, we could say that the reserved
wage equation reflects the attitudes to work of different groups, which may
be treated as part of the endowment effect. Cultural attitudes to work are,
after all, part of a labour market endowment of any group, and can be
altered over time.
Thus, add
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN +
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN =
(
λˆN − λˆI
)
θˆN to get Selectivity
5:
y¯N − y¯I =(
X¯N − X¯I
)
βˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆI
)
θˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment
+ X¯I
(
βˆN − βˆI
)
+ λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(2.13)
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This would correspond to asking a question of what log-wages would
immigrants get, if they face the native wage equation, but their own selection
equation.
On the other hand, the differences in the γ parameters may reflect pri-
marily the differences in the wage offer coefficients. If this is true, then the
term (λˆ0I − λˆI)θˆN will reflect a part of discrimination.
This point will be revisited in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.2 Quantile regression (QR)
The question to ask at this point is, what happens across the whole wage
distribution: is it likely that the wage gap is the same for different quantiles
of the wage distribution? I follow Albrecht et al. [2004] in constructing
counterfactual wage distributions as in Machado and Mata [2005] and similar
to Buchinsky [1998], while taking account of the sample selection problem
a` la Heckman [1979].
Following Buchinsky [1998], rewriting the model in equations (2.1)–(2.4)
in the quantile form gives:
y∗j = Xjβq,j + uq,j (0 < q < 1), (2.14)
yrj = Zjβ
r
q,j + vq,j, (2.15)
Dj = I(y
∗
j − yrj > 0), (2.16)
yj = Djy
∗
j , (2.17)
where uq,j = Xj(βj − βq,j) + uj and vq,j = Zj(βrj − βrq,j) + vj, (j ∈ {N, I}).
With this model, the conditional quantile of the observed wage is then:
Quantq(yj |Xj) = Quantq(y∗j |Xj ,Dj = 1) + Quantq(uq,j|Xj ,Dj = 1)
= Xjβq,j +Quantq(uq,j|Xj ,Dj = 1), (2.18)
where, similar to section 2.3.1, Quantq(uq,j|Xj ,Dj = 1) can be estimated
as λˆjθq,j, such that it is possible to rewrite equation (2.18) in disturbance
form, to get a quantile regression equivalent of equation (2.5) from section
2.3.1:
Quantq(yj |Xj) = Xjβq,j + λjθq,j + εq,j , (2.19)
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where Quantq(εq,j|Xj ,Dj = 1) = 0.
The estimation strategy is the quantile regression version of Heckman’s
two-step procedure from section 2.3.1. First, use Probit to estimate the γ
parameters and construct the predicted Mills ratio, λˆ. Next, substitute λˆ for
λ in equation (2.19), and estimate βq and θq from linear quantile regression.
For the purposes of decomposition, it is necessary to create a counter-
factual wage distribution of immigrant women, assuming that the market
treats their endowments as if they were native women. The basic approach
with respect to selectivity in this case is to assume that immigrant women
also have the coefficients of the selection equation from the native regression.
This is exactly the Selectivity 2 given in equation (2.10), and has been fol-
lowed in the gender wage-gap decomposition literature [Garc´ıa et al., 2001].
I use the following version of Machado-Mata algorithm for creating pre-
dicted and counter-factual log-wage distributions [Albrecht et al., 2004,
Machado and Mata, 2005]:
1. Estimate γj with Probit and compute λˆj the Inverse Mills ratio,
2. Sample q from a uniform distribution,
3. Substitute λˆj for λj in quantile regression (2.19) and estimate βq,j and
θq,j,
4. Take a random xI,i from the empirical distribution of xI,i,
5. Compute yˆI,i = xI,iβˆq,I + λˆI,iθˆq,I ,
6. Repeat steps 2–5 100 times.
This creates a 100-point distribution of predicted log wages of immigrants
(denoted wI in Section 2.5.2). Similarly, create the distribution of log-wages
of natives (denoted wN in Section 2.5.2).
To create the counter-factual distribution of log-wages of immigrants, if
immigrants followed both the selectivity and the labour market offer wage
equations, replace λˆI,i with λˆ
0
I,i, and βˆq,I and θˆq,I with βˆq,N and θˆq,N , in step
5 of the above algorithm. This distribution will be denoted WINS (wages
of immigrants if they followed the native selection and wage offer equations)
in Section 2.5.2.
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Thus, there obtain the following distributions (dropping the subscript
q):10
wN : XN βˆN + λN θˆN ,
wI : XI βˆI + λI θˆI ,
WINS : XI βˆN + λ
0
I θˆN ,
which gives rise to the following difference:
wN −WINS = (XN −XI)βˆN + (λN − λ0I)θˆN , (2.20)
which is nothing other than the endowment part of equation (2.10), i.e.,
Selectivity 2. The other part of the wage gap (wN −wI) is then:
WINS − wI = XI(βˆN − βˆI) + λ0I θˆN − λI θˆI , (2.21)
which is the discrimination part in equation (2.10).
Selectivity 1, 3, and 4?
The previous Section showed how to obtain a quantile regression equivalent
of equation (2.10), i.e., Selectivity 2. This is done through generating a
counterfactual distribution of wages for immigrants, as if they followed the
selectivity adjustment as well as receiving the wage offer according to the
native equations (wages for immigrants with native Mills ratios: WINS).
But what about other Selectivities? Let us proceed step-by-step. Recall
the mean regression decomposition of the selection equation:
λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI =
(
λˆ0I − λˆI
)
θˆN +
(
λˆN − λˆ0I
)
θˆN + λˆI
(
θˆN − θˆI
)
(2.22)
This decomposition relies on calculation of the mean (sometimes, counter-
factual) characteristics terms, λˆN , λˆ
0
I and λˆI , the quantile equivalents for
which do not exist. Thus, Selectivity 1–4 in equations (2.9)–(2.12) cannot
be distinguished from one another, since they rely on separate identification
of the three terms in equation (2.22).
In the quantile regression analysis, we first calculate the gaps between
the observed wage distributions (say, wN−wI) at various quantiles, then es-
10From now on, I will drop the subscript q when presenting the distributions.
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timate the counter-factual distribution (say, of immigrant women when they
face native wage offers and selection, WINS), compare this new (counter-
factual) distribution to the native wage distribution at various quantiles,
and see how the wage gap (at various quantiles) changed (wN −WINS).
The gap wN−WINS represents the endowment effect, since any counter-
factual distribution keeps the endowments of the immigrant women intact,
and uses the native coefficients to estimate the wages. The rest is then
WINS − wI, which in this case is called “discrimination”. The individual
parts of this discrimination part (WINS − wI) cannot be identified. It is
because in quantile regressions, measuring the equivalent of the last part
from equation (2.22), for example, entails the knowledge of the λˆI of the
median person, which is likely different across distributions.
When the counter-factual distribution is generated using a set of quantile
coefficients βˆN and the Mills ratios λˆ
0
I , the person with the median income
(the “median person”) may be John. John’s characteristic λ0J will therefore
be the “median person’s” characteristic, and this will typically have nothing
to do with the median value of all observations of the Mills ratios {λ0i }. On
the other hand, when the income distribution is generated using the quantile
coefficients βˆI and the Mills ratio λI , the median person may be Ronald,
with his Mills ratio λ0R 6= λ0J as the median Mills ratio. John, of course,
could be at the top or the bottom of this other distribution. The mean
value of the Mills ratios {λ0i } will be the same in both cases.
Thus, the decompositions Selectivity 1, 3 and 4 (corresponding to equa-
tions (2.9), (2.11) and (2.12), respectively) cannot be estimated, since they
depend crucially on the last term of equation (2.22), λˆI(θˆN − θˆI), belonging
to the endowment part in the first case, and to the selectivity part in the lat-
ter two, and on all the terms of equation (2.22) belonging to the selectivity
part in Selectivity 4.
The only thing that can be estimated exactly is Selectivity 2. This is
furthermore indistinguishable from Selectivity 3, due to the impossibility of
estimating the selectivity part on its own.
Finally, we close with the following:
Identification: The individual parts of the difference WINS −wI can be
identified if the ranking of the persons’ log wages does not change
across the distributions (in our earlier example, say, John is always
the median guy, Ronald is always the 75th percentile guy, and so on).
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One sufficient condition for this is that the coefficients do not change
across the quantiles, that is, if the true model is the simple OLS.
Selection equation coefficients
If Selectivities other than 2 are not possible, what can we do? With some
assumptions, we can look at selection equation coefficients, γ, which reflect
the difference in the coefficients of the offer and the reserved wage equations.
This has been looked at in Section 2.3.1.
To the extent that the differences in the reserved-wage equation coeffi-
cients dominate the differences in the offer wage coefficients, we can write
these differences into the endowment part of the wage gap. In this case,
we create the counter-factual distribution WINC: this is the distribution
of log-wages of immigrants, if they face the native wage equation, but their
own selection equation (which corresponds to Selectivity 5 from equation
(2.13)):
wN : XN βˆN + λN θˆN ,
wI : XI βˆI + λI θˆI ,
WINC : XI βˆN + λI θˆN ,
which leads to the difference:
wN −WINC = (XN −XI)βˆN + (λN − λI)θˆN . (2.23)
Furthermore, investigating WINS −WINC(= (λˆ0I − λˆI)θˆN ) may give
some indication of the differences in the attitudes to work between the two
groups of women, but only if the reserved-wage equation coefficients reflect
(mainly) cultural preferences.
On the other hand, the differences in the γ parameters may reflect pri-
marily the differences in the wage offer coefficients. If this is true, then the
term (λˆ0I − λˆI)θˆN will reflect a part of discrimination, in which case the
distribution WINC will have no useful meaning.
Adjusted wage-gap decomposition
Apart from Selectivity 2 and WINC, we can attempt to gain some feeling
for the size of the selectivity differences λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI from equation (2.22),
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by doing the adjusted wage-gap decomposition (recall equation (2.7)), and
comparing the results to the Selectivity 2 decomposition.
It is easy to generate the distributions of wages, adjusted for selectivity,
with a different version of the pervious algorithm:
1. Estimate γj with Probit and compute λˆj the Inverse Mills ratio,
2. Sample q from a uniform distribution,
3. Substitute λˆj for λj in quantile regression (2.19) and estimate βq,j and
θq,j,
4. Take a random xI,i from the empirical distribution of xI,i,
5. Compute y˜I,i = xI,iβˆq,I (≡ yˆI,i − λˆI,iθˆq,I defined before),
6. Repeat steps 2–5 100 times,
and, similarly, for the native women. For the immigrant women using native
women’s coefficients, substitute βˆq,N for βˆq,I in step 5, to get the counter-
factual distribution of “adjusted” immigrant women’s wages, WINA:
wNadj : XN βˆN ,
wIadj : XI βˆI ,
WINA : XI βˆN ,
which gives the difference:
wNadj −WINA = (XN −XI)βˆN . (2.24)
Please, note that this is not the same as Selectivity 4 (equation (2.12)),
for the reasons given in Section 2.3.2: equation (2.24) provides an adjusted
distribution, in which a person at the 25th quantile can come from the 75th
quantile from the original distribution, for all we know.
In the mean regression world, it was possible to correctly write the fol-
lowing identity (using equation (2.7)):
y¯N − y¯I −
(
λˆN θˆN − λˆI θˆI
) ≡ y˜N − y˜I , (2.25)
However, in the world of distributions, a quantile Q(·) value of the wage
from the adjusted distribution is not the same as the corresponding quantile
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wage value from the normal distribution minus the associated with that
value selection adjustment:
Q(y˜j) ≡ Q(yj − λˆj θˆj) 6= Q(yj)−Q(λˆj θˆj). (2.26)
Nevertheless, this decomposition is useful in that it might tell us some-
thing about the relative sizes of endowment and coefficient effects, after
abstracting away from the selectivity. Here, we ask the following question:
whatever the selectivity issues, what would the wage gap be if immigrants’
endowments (other than their selecting themselves into the labour force)
were treated the same way as those of the natives?
Furthermore, the size of the selectivity-adjusted gap, as compared to the
non-adjusted wage gap, might also hint on the importance of the selectivity
differences.
With respect to the “discrimination” definition in this case, we avoid
discussing the selection equation coefficient differences by taking them out.
2.4 Data
All data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel. One object of this
paper is to study the effect of selection into the labour force, so the sample
used includes only women (native and immigrant) of age 25–65, that were
surveyed in 2006. The techniques utilised here are cross-section techniques,
and 2006 has the most up-to-date information and one of the largest samples
for the natives and immigrants alike.
Since selectivity into the labour force is a problem mostly applicable to
women, only the female sub-sample is used. An immigrant is any woman
that did not have German citizenship since birth (including all those without
German citizenship at all).
I follow Gang and Zimmermann [2000] in selecting only those women who
have finished school in Germany. I select these if a foreign woman replied to
have had schooling in Germany in the SOEP questionnaire, or if a German
woman had not replied “No” to the same question. This is to ensure that
education differences between natives and immigrants are minimised.
A person is deemed employed if her employment status in the ques-
tionnaire is “employed full-time”, “in regular part-time employment” or “in
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vocational training” (the latter indicates a strong desire to be in the labour
force), unemployed if “marginally employed” or “not employed”, with all
other observations being dropped (including “working zero hours near re-
tirement” and missing observations).
The dependent variable is a log of a generated hourly wage. In the
sample, most people have contracts that stipulate hours to be worked and the
salary, which can be interpreted as stipulating an hourly wage. To generate
the hourly wage, I divided the reported monthly wage by hours worked. I
dropped observations with missing or improbable wage answers (i.e., hourly
wage below 4 Euro or above 50 Euro). The unemployed have zero hourly
wage. The reported “actual hours per week” worked were divided by 10, as
the given answers were almost always 10 times the probable hours (i.e., over
400 hours worked per week).
The independent variables are:
• Years of schooling11
• Years of tenure12
• Age and Age Squared: to account for diminishing returns to age13
• Marriage status
• Number of children that are less than six years old
• Log of monthly income from other household members (e.g., from a
spouse or parents)
11Garc´ıa et al. [2001] suggest that education can be endogenous. Furthermore, Albrecht
et al. [2003] suggest using different degrees earned instead of years of education: since
even with the same number of years of education, people can have different quality of
education that would be better shown with the degrees earned. I leave these adjustments
for future research.
12Heckman [1977] suggests that the years of tenure are exogenous in the wage equation
but endogenous in the selection equation, and therefore need to be instrumented. On the
other hand, the recent literature seems to ignore this point altogether. Some preliminary
regressions with instrumenting for tenure along the lines of Heckman [1977] return non-
sensical results such as insignificant coefficients across the board and negative predicted
log-wages. Furthermore, the Wald test cannot reject the exogeneity of tenure for the im-
migrant subsample. Given all this, I follow Albrecht et al. [2003, 2004] and Buchinsky
[2001] by concentrating just on the selectivity adjustment, and leave the endogeneity of
tenure for future research.
13Age is often used as a proxy for tenure [see, e.g., Albrecht et al., 2003]. However,
SOEP contains tenure information directly, so age can be used in its own right.
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The variable for other household income was generated using the total
(net) household monthly income minus the personal (net) monthly income,
both for the last month before the questionnaire.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide some summary statistics for the full sample,
including the unemployed.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics: immigrant women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
employed 0.425 0.495 0 1
schooling 10.885 2.371 7 18
tenure 5.770 5.613 0 32
No. of children below 6y.o. 0.399 0.581 0 4
married 0.729 0.445 0 1
hourly wage 3.414 4.199 0 16.702
monthly income, other HH 1653.172 952.03 1 5300
age 34.915 5.39 26 53
N 1227
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: native women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
employed 0.568 0.495 0 1
schooling 12.316 2.517 7 18
tenure 10.812 7.28 0 37
No. of children below 6y.o. 0.38 0.674 0 3
married 0.599 0.49 0 1
hourly wage 4.936 5.067 0 50
monthly income, other HH 1740.401 1247.838 1 8000
age 38.473 8.087 26 54
N 16825
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Mean regression
Tables 2.3–2.4 provide results from the probit regressions for the immigrant
and native selection equations. The Z-variables not included in X in further
regressions are: marriage dummy, number of children under six years of age,
and log of other household members’ monthly income. All these variables
affect the decision of a woman to enter the labour force, but should not
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affect a wage offered to her in the labour force. All variables have expected
sign and significance.
We can not directly compare the coefficients from different samples.
However, we can note the marriage has a higher coefficient in the immi-
grant sub-sample than in the native one, a finding that we would expect
from anecdotal evidence. On the other hand, the income of other household
members plays a much more pronounced role in the native subsample, while
having a small effect on the immigrant women’s decision to participate in
the labour force.
One could classify both these variables as an indication of support from
other household members. Thus, we can say that the more support a woman
receives from her household, the less it is necessary for her to enter the
labour force, irrespective of the group she belongs to. However, the way her
household supports her might be different:
A native woman may spend more time at home, pursuing education
(for example), while being supported by her parents, and enter the labour
force after obtaining her education (Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that native
women have 1.5 years of education more, on average, than immigrants; this
difference is significant under a two-sample t-test with equal variances). Im-
migrant women, on the other hand, may be forced to leave education earlier,
perhaps because their parents do not have enough income to support their
daughters’ education.
This story is consistent with the significant and positive coefficient on
the age variable for the native women, and close to zero for the immigrant
women. For native women, age is a good predictor of employment, as op-
posed to immigrant women. Furthermore, the same forces may entice immi-
grant women to rely more on marriage, reflected in the incidence of married
women (0.729 for immigrant women to 0.599 for natives, Tables 2.1 and
2.2; the difference is significant under a t-test) and the size difference of the
marriage dummy’s coefficient in the regressions for the two sub-samples.
The coefficients for schooling and the number of small children probably
do not differ, but tenure seems to have a stronger effect on an immigrant’s
decision to work than on a native’s. However, it is not possible to read much
into the results for these variables.
There seems to exist an indication of potential differences in the mech-
anism of selection into the labour force for different groups of women in
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Germany, but this is not a conclusive proof thereof.
Table 2.3: Probit for immigrant women selection
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
schooling 0.137∗∗ (0.020)
tenure 0.141∗∗ (0.011)
age 0.002 (0.080)
age squared -0.001 (0.001)
married -0.396∗∗ (0.094)
No. of children below 6y.o. -0.667∗∗ (0.081)
log of other HH income -0.044 (0.027)
Intercept -0.615 (1.495)
N 1227
Log-likelihood -599.864
χ2(7) 473.86
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.4: Probit for native women selection
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
schooling 0.116∗∗ (0.005)
tenure 0.107∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.041∗∗ (0.014)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
married -0.047† (0.024)
No. of children below 6y.o. -0.590∗∗ (0.019)
log of other HH income -0.140∗∗ (0.008)
Intercept -0.799∗∗ (0.287)
N 16825
Log-likelihood -8887.674
χ2(7) 5336.974
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the results of the second step of the Heckman’s
two-step estimator for immigrant and native women, respectively. The esti-
mated coefficients in these tables are supposed to indicate how the German
labour market treats one unit of endowments (schooling, tenure, etc.) of
different groups of women.
Again, it is difficult to compare the coefficients directly, but the im-
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migrant regression results (Table 2.5) are quite striking.14 The immigrant
intercept has a very large and significant value, schooling has a positive and
significant value, and everything else seems unimportant. The native inter-
cept, on the other hand, is much smaller (by an order of nine—Table 2.6),
while everything else has expected signs and significance.
The intercept should indicate the very basic discrimination of the labour
market, if there is any, since it is what the market would pay to a candidate
of a particular sub-sample with zero other endowments. The particular
intercepts from Tables 2.5 and 2.6 would indicate a positive discrimination
towards immigrant women.
Table 2.5: OLS: Immigrant women, dependant variable: log hourly wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
schooling 0.033∗∗ (0.006)
tenure 0.002 (0.004)
age -0.027 (0.017)
age squared 0.000† (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.067 (0.168)
Intercept 2.024∗∗ (0.350)
N 522
R2 0.095
F (5,516) 10.891
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Of course, drawing conclusions only from the coefficients of two differ-
ent regressions is problematic, and we now move onto the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition of the (predicted) wage gap (results are given in Table 2.7).
The log-wage gap is estimated to be 0.0543, and the two-sample t-test shows
that this difference is significant. Again, the coefficient entry indicates pos-
itive discrimination, as it explains from negative 78 to negative 186 percent
of the log-wage gap. We learn that no matter the decomposition, the endow-
ment differences play the biggest role in explaining the gap between average
native and immigrant wages.
Selectivity 2, reflecting the most encompassing view of discrimination,
attributes the smallest effect to it (negative 78 percent). Selectivity 4, which
14Significance sign on the Mills ratio would normally be troubling, but in this case can
come from a relatively small sample size.
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Table 2.6: OLS: Native women, dependant variable: log hourly wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
schooling 0.061∗∗ (0.002)
tenure 0.013∗∗ (0.001)
age 0.048∗∗ (0.004)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.185∗∗ (0.053)
Intercept 0.225∗ (0.088)
N 9356
R2 0.191
F (5,9350) 441.203
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
treats all of the selectivity as such, attributes the largest (negative) effect to
the coefficient differences.
The selectivity-adjusted decomposition (called “Sel.-adj” and related to
equation (2.7)) shows no significant difference between the average wages
(according to a t-test), and again shows the large negative coefficient effect
(indicating positive discrimination).
It is worth noting that “Sel.-adj” (log-) wage gap is the same as in
Selectivity 4, minus the selectivity part. The value added of the Selectivities
1–4 is exactly that the wage gap is decomposed into three different parts,
but all in one equation.
Finally, Selectivity 5 shows no practical difference to Selectivities 1–4:
the endowment plays the biggest role in explaining the wage gap, while the
coefficient differences indicate positive discrimination.
To sum up, there is one strong result that can be inferred from this
analysis: the endowment effect dominates the wage gap. Thus, to address
the wage dap, it is necessary to improve the educational attainment and
other endowments of the immigrants. Even among working women, natives
have one year more education than immigrants. Among unemployed, the
gap increases to 1.5 years (see Tables 2.1–2.2 for the full sample; summary
stats for employed are not presented).
In the next section, we turn to the comparison of the wage gap at various
quantiles of the wage distribution.
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Table 2.7: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with selectivity bias for women
Sel.-adj Sel.1 Sel.2 Sel.3 Sel.4 Sel.5
log-wage gap 0.006 0.0543 0.0543 0.0543 0.0543 0.0543
Endowment 0.107 0.1509 0.0965 0.0965 0.1071 0.1013
% of gap 1859 % 277.66 % 177.56 % 177.56 % 197.07 % 186.36 %
Coefficient −0.101 −0.0965 −0.0421 −0.0965 −0.1013 −0.0469
% of gap −1759 % −177.66 % −77.56 % −177.66 % −186.47 % −86.36 %
Selectivity NA 0 0 0.0544 0.0486 0
% of gap NA 0 % 0 % 100.11 % 89.40 0 % %
2.5.2 Quantile regression
We utilise information from the regressions in Tables 2.3–2.4 to construct
the Mills ratios, just like with the mean wage-gap decompositions, but then
we follow the algorithms provided in Section 2.3.2 to construct the actual
and counter-factual predicted wage distributions, wI, wN , wIadj, wNadj,
WINS, WINC and WINA.
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 provide the quantile regression results for immi-
grants and natives, with their respective Mills ratios. Similarly to the mean
regressions, the intercept for immigrant regression is larger than the inter-
cept for native regression, at almost all quantiles. Again, the rest of the
coefficients (apart from schooling) are insignificant for the immigrants at
almost all quantiles, while for the native regression the coefficients have the
expected signs and significance.
It is not possible to say much beyond what has been said for the mean
regression, on the basis of the differences in coefficients for the two sub-
samples, so we turn to the different distribution-based decompositions, pre-
sented in Tables 2.8–2.9 and 2.10–2.11.
Tables 2.8–2.9 show the quantile values for all the distributions in ques-
tion: the log wage distributions for natives (wN) and immigrants (wI),
two counter-factual distributions: for immigrants, as if they followed the
selectivity adjustment as well as receiving the wage offer according to the
native equation (wages for immigrants with native Mills ratios: WINS),
and for immigrants, as if they were paid like natives for their labour market
characteristics, while keeping their own selectivity adjustment (wages for
immigrants with native coefficients: WINC); and the selectivity-adjusted
distributions wNadj and wIadj for natives and immigrants, respectively,
and WINA, the counter-factual distribution of selectivity-adjusted immi-
grant log wages, if immigrants followed the wage-equation of the natives. I
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bootstrap the confidence intervals.
The values in these tables are estimated in the following way: I repeat
the algorithm given in section 2.3.2 25 times to generate 25 distributions
of each type. Then, for each quantile and each distribution (wN , WINS,
etc.), I take the median value from those 25 points to be the estimate for
that quantile of that distribution, and the lower and upper values create the
bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Next, to see whether the wage distributions are similar, I generate a
χ-squared statistic for every quantile, with the null hypothesis that the
pointwise confidence intervals come from the same distribution. The p-
values are presented in Tables 2.10–2.11: small p’s reject the null even at
quantiles where the confidence intervals overlap.
It is striking to see how the predicted log-wage gap behaves across the
distribution: the immigrants actually get higher wages than the natives at
the bottom of the distribution, same wages in the middle, and lower at the
top (see Figure 2.1). From Tables 2.8–2.11: below the 35th percentile, wN is
significantly lower than wI (at a one percent level), such that the wage gap is
actually favouring immigrants.15 In the middle of the distribution (quantiles
35–45), there is no significant distinction between the values, while at the top
end of the distribution, wN > wI. The selectivity-adjusted wNadj > wIadj
for all quantiles.
Furthermore, if immigrant women follow the selectivity and wage equa-
tions of the native women, they get basically the same wages as if they
follow their own equations (notice the identical estimates of wI and WINS
in Tables 2.8–2.9 and the p-values and signs in the column wI =WINS in
Table 2.10), and still experience the wage gap for exactly the same quan-
tiles (wage gap at the bottom of the distribution favouring immigrants, no
wage gap in the lower middle, and expected wage gap at the top half of the
distribution—notice the p-values and signs in the column wN =WINS).
Remember that the distribution WINS reflects the treatment of selec-
tivity that corresponds to Selectivity 2 from equation (2.10) from Section
2.3.1, and the differences between wN and WINS correspond precisely to
the endowment effect from equation (2.10).16 Thus, this decomposition indi-
15At the five percent level, there are more quantiles where the distributions are unequal.
16As mentioned at the end of section 2.3.2, WINS is constructed using the endowments
of immigrants and the coefficients of the natives from both the offer wage and selection
equations (the latter through λˆ0I).
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Table 2.8: The log-wages at various quantiles of different distributions for
immigrants and natives: two factual (wN and wI) and two counter-factual
(WINC and WINS—for immigrants as if they were paid like natives but
selected themselves into work like immigrants, and for immigrants as if they
were paid and followed the selectivity-into-work equation like natives, re-
spectively). CI are the bootstrapped confidence intervals around the quan-
tile values.
10 ub 15 ub 20 ub 25 ub 30 ub
wN 1.65 1.72 1.80 1.86 1.91
CI 1.57 1.79 1.63 1.87 1.70 1.91 1.78 1.96 1.81 2.01
wI 1.73 1.79 1.86 1.92 1.96
CI 1.67 1.82 1.73 1.89 1.78 1.94 1.82 1.98 1.85 1.99
WINS 1.73 1.79 1.85 1.91 1.96
CI 1.65 1.86 1.72 1.94 1.79 1.95 1.85 1.99 1.90 2.00
WINC 1.61 1.68 1.72 1.78 1.82
CI 1.50 1.76 1.61 1.79 1.66 1.83 1.71 1.87 1.76 1.91
wNadj 1.24 1.39 1.54 1.69 1.79
CI 1.12 1.58 1.22 1.67 1.30 1.80 1.47 1.94 1.64 1.99
wIadj 0.67 0.81 0.95 1.09 1.17
CI 0.42 0.83 0.63 1.02 0.69 1.19 0.81 1.25 0.91 1.32
WINA 1.21 1.35 1.45 1.56 1.65
CI 0.91 1.57 1.15 1.62 1.31 1.68 1.41 1.79 1.48 1.84
35 ub 40 ub 45 ub 50 ub 55 ub
wN 1.97 2.02 2.06 2.09 2.13
CI 1.89 2.08 1.94 2.14 1.98 2.17 2.01 2.22 2.08 2.24
wI 1.99 2.00 2.02 2.04 2.04
CI 1.86 2.01 1.92 2.03 1.99 2.05 2.00 2.06 2.02 2.08
WINS 1.98 2.00 2.02 2.04 2.04
CI 1.95 2.02 1.97 2.04 1.99 2.04 2.01 2.05 2.02 2.07
WINC 1.86 1.89 1.94 1.99 2.03
CI 1.79 1.96 1.85 1.99 1.88 2.04 1.91 2.07 1.95 2.11
wNadj 1.87 1.95 2.01 2.06 2.09
CI 1.75 2.05 1.80 2.09 1.87 2.15 1.95 2.19 2.03 2.25
wIadj 1.22 1.30 1.35 1.45 1.50
CI 1.00 1.36 1.19 1.42 1.24 1.49 1.35 1.54 1.40 1.61
WINA 1.77 1.82 1.91 1.97 2.02
CI 1.64 1.93 1.71 1.98 1.79 2.03 1.83 2.07 1.91 2.10
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Table 2.9: Table 2.8 continued
60 ub 65 ub 70 ub 75 ub 80 ub
wN 2.18 2.22 2.26 2.33 2.37
CI 2.11 2.28 2.13 2.31 2.19 2.39 2.25 2.41 2.29 2.47
wI 2.06 2.09 2.14 2.19 2.24
CI 2.03 2.14 2.04 2.17 2.05 2.23 2.09 2.26 2.14 2.28
WINS 2.06 2.10 2.14 2.18 2.24
CI 2.03 2.13 2.04 2.16 2.06 2.22 2.14 2.25 2.17 2.30
WINC 2.08 2.13 2.17 2.24 2.28
CI 2.00 2.17 2.04 2.22 2.09 2.26 2.19 2.30 2.22 2.36
wNadj 2.16 2.21 2.28 2.32 2.38
CI 2.08 2.29 2.13 2.31 2.15 2.37 2.22 2.41 2.30 2.46
wIadj 1.57 1.63 1.70 1.76 1.81
CI 1.48 1.67 1.52 1.73 1.62 1.77 1.69 1.83 1.75 1.90
WINA 2.08 2.12 2.19 2.24 2.28
CI 1.98 2.18 2.03 2.25 2.11 2.28 2.16 2.31 2.20 2.35
85 ub 90 ub
wN 2.46 2.54
CI 2.32 2.52 2.41 2.66
wI 2.28 2.35
CI 2.22 2.35 2.27 2.47
WINS 2.28 2.35
CI 2.21 2.35 2.26 2.44
WINC 2.34 2.42
CI 2.25 2.43 2.32 2.48
wNadj 2.45 2.52
CI 2.37 2.54 2.41 2.60
wIadj 1.88 1.95
CI 1.80 1.96 1.88 2.03
WINA 2.32 2.38
CI 2.26 2.44 2.30 2.50
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cates that the whole difference between the wages of natives and immigrants
comes only from the endowment differences.
If we believe Selectivity 2 and this conclusion, we must also accept that
at the bottom of the distribution, immigrants seem to have a better mix of
labour market characteristics/endowments. This reverses for the top half of
the distribution.
Table 2.10: p-values for the test of equal wages at given quantiles for given
pairs of distributions. Zeros indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis
that the bootstrapped quantile (point-wise) confidence intervals come from
the same distribution.
wN = wI wI =WINS wI =WINC wN =WINS wN =WINC
10 0 (<) 1.00 0 (>) 0 (<) 0.09
15 0 (<) 1.00 0 (>) 0.02 0.02
20 0 (<) 0.57 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>)
25 0 (<) 1.00 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>)
30 0 (<) 1.00 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>)
35 0.57 0.26 0 (>) 0.57 0 (>)
40 0.57 1.00 0 (>) 0.26 0 (>)
45 0.26 1.00 0 (>) 0.09 0 (>)
50 0 (>) 0.57 0.02 0 (>) 0 (>)
55 0 (>) 1.00 0.26 0 (>) 0 (>)
60 0 (>) 0.57 1.00 0 (>) 0 (>)
65 0 (>) 1.00 0.02 0 (>) 0 (>)
70 0 (>) 1.00 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
75 0 (>) 0.57 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
80 0 (>) 0.26 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
85 0 (>) 0.57 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
90 0 (>) 1.00 0.02 0 (>) 0 (>)
Recall also that in the mean-wage decomposition, Selectivity 2 provided
the lowest effect of coefficient differences, and that effect indicated positive
discrimination (Table 2.7). The mean-wage decomposition was a mechanical
exercise, however, and in light of the QR decomposition evidence, we see
that the effect of differences in coefficients seems insignificant. On the other
hand, the magnitude of the endowment effect is supported in both cases.
To remind us, the analysis in this Section assumes that the differences in
selection equation coefficients come primarily from the offered-wage equa-
tion. Next, I show what happens if the alternative assumption is accepted.
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Figure 2.1: Predicted log-wage distributions wN and wI with their boot-
strapped upper and lower bounds
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Table 2.11: p-values for the test of equal wages at given quantiles for given
pairs of distributions. Zeros indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis
that the bootstrapped quantile (point-wise) confidence intervals come from
the same distribution, Table 2.10 continued
wNadj = wIadj wIadj =WINA wNadj =WINA WINS =WINC
10 0 (>) 0 (<) 0.57 0 (>)
15 0 (>) 0 (<) 0.02 0 (>)
20 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
25 0 (>) 0 (<) 0.02 0 (>)
30 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
35 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
40 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
45 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
50 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (>)
55 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0.26
60 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0.57
65 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0.09
70 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (<)
75 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (<)
80 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (<)
85 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (<)
90 0 (>) 0 (<) 0 (>) 0 (<)
Selection equation coefficients: WINC
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, we can assume that the differences in the γ
parameters reflect primarily the differences in the reserved-wage equation
coefficients: i.e., γ parameters reflect the personal preferences, cultural at-
titudes, etc., which can be attributed to endowment.
We see that wI > wN > WINC at the bottom of the distribution,
and wI < WINC < wN at the top (see Table 2.10 and Figure 2.2). The
difference wN − WINC is the endowment effect from Selectivity 5, but
WINC−wI means that there also exists a significant non-endowment gap.
This decomposition indicates positive discrimination at the bottom of the
distribution, and negative at the top: If immigrant women kept their own
selectivity technology, but faced the offered wage equation of the native
women, they would have been worse-off at the bottom of the distribution,
and better-off at the top.
Compare this to the results from the mean regression given in Table 2.7,
which show positive discrimination on average.
Remember also that until the 50th quantile, the wageWINS was higher
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or not significantly lower than that of the natives. We can see thatWINC <
WINS at the bottom of the distribution, WINC = WINS for quan-
tiles 55–65, and WINC > WINS at the top (see Figure 2.3, the column
WINS =WINC in Table 2.11 and predicted wages in Tables 2.8–2.9).
The only difference betweenWINS andWINC is the part (λˆ0I−λˆI)θˆq,N ,
which reflects precisely the difference between γˆN − γˆI . This is the differ-
ence in the attitudes to work in two populations, by our initial assumption.
Thus, if the initial assumption of this Section is correct, immigrant women’s
attitudes to work are more positive at the top of the wage distribution, and
more negative at the bottom, when compared to the native women.
Adjusted wage-gap decomposition: WINA
The selectivity-adjusted decomposition, on the other hand, indicates catch-
ing-up throughout the whole distribution if immigrants face the natives’
wage offer equation (see Figure 2.4, and the p-values in the column wNadj =
WINA in Table 2.11). The large difference WINA − wIadj indicates dis-
crimination across the whole distribution (see the column wIadj = WINA
in Table 2.11). If we abstract away from the selectivity differences, then
almost all of the wage gap comes from the coefficient part (Figure 2.4 and
the absolute values of the wages in Tables 2.8–2.9).
However, this is not consistent with the equivalent approach for the
mean-wage decomposition (“Sel.-adj” from Table 2.7 and equation (2.7)),
which indicated no significant difference in the means of the selectivity-
adjusted wages.
Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the prominence of the labour
market characteristics in previous sections comes mainly through the selec-
tion equation. Remember, that the main difference between the endowment
effects in Selectivities 1–5 and in the adjusted wage gap decomposition is
in the treatment of the differences in the labour market characteristics’ ef-
fects on the selection equation. That is, the differences in Z-variables are
included in the endowment effect in Selectivities 1–5, but are taken out of
the wage gap in the selectivity-adjusted decomposition.
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Figure 2.2: Log-wage distributions wN , wI and a counter-factual distribu-
tion WINC; note: WINS is almost identical to wI, so not shown
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Figure 2.3: Counter-factual distributionsWINS andWINC; note: WINS
is almost identical to wI
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Figure 2.4: Selectivity-adjested distributions wNadj, wIadj and the
counter-factual distribution WINA
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper attempted to shed some light, in the quantile regression context,
on various ways to decompose the wage-gap according to Neuman and Oax-
aca [2003]. It turns out that Selectivity 2, in which the differences in the se-
lectivity equation coefficients and the Mills ratio coefficient are both treated
as part of discrimination, has the most straight-forward quantile regression
(QR) equivalent, and no other Selectivity from Neuman and Oaxaca [2003]
is possible without additional (stringent) assumptions on the distribution of
wages.
The QR decompositions based on Neuman and Oaxaca [2003] assume
that selection equation coefficients are influenced primarily by the offer-wage
equation coefficients. On the other hand, it might be possible to compare
how differences in attitudes to work affect the wages, all else being equal,
under an alternative assumption that selection equation coefficients are in-
fluenced primarily by the reserved-wage equation coefficients. In this vein,
I also have introduced a novel way of decomposing the wage gap.
Furthermore, the paper highlights the differences between these ap-
proaches using a mean and quantile regression-based decompositions: while
the mean regression paints a very consistent picture of positive discrimina-
tion and the importance of endowments in explaining the wage gap, the QR
approach most consistent with the mean regression results (i.e., Selectivity
2) does not find any evidence of discrimination, but supports the predomi-
nant importance of the endowment effect in explaining the wage gap.
Under the assumption that the selection equation coefficients reflect at-
titudes to work, the paper shows two things: First, that immigrants possess
more positive attitudes to work than their native counter-parts, at the top
of the distribution, the reverse holding at the bottom, with equality at the
55th–65th quantiles; and Second, that there seems to be positive discrimi-
nation at the bottom of the distribution, and negative at the top, with none
in the middle. However, the paper does not establish the validity of said
assumption.
Furthermore, given the difficulties implementing various selectivity-based
decompositions, the paper points out potential attractiveness of a selectivity-
adjusted wage decomposition. However, in this case the results from the QR
and mean regression approaches differ widely in the importance of the coef-
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ficient differences in the wage offer equations.
Finally, if anything should be taken away from this research, it is its
practical message: to address the income inequality between immigrant and
native women in Germany, the endowment differences should be addressed
first and foremost. These are also the easiest to tackle of all factors con-
tributing to the wage gap. According to most evidence, the endowment
differences could also be the only contributing factor.
Before finishing off, a couple of words about future research. As a next
step, the analysis should be repeated while taking account of potential endo-
geneity of several regressors. Heckman [1977] presents strong evidence that
years of tenure is endogenous in the selection equation, but not in offered
wage equation. Garc´ıa et al. [2001] suggest that education can be endoge-
nous. Furthermore, Albrecht et al. [2003] suggest using different degrees
earned instead of years of education: since even with the same number of
years of education, people can have different quality of education that would
be better shown with the degrees earned.
Finally, a word on the implicit assumptions behind the word “discrimina-
tion”. I have tried to make these explicit: in particular, on the importance
of the reserved-wage and the offered-wage equation coefficients, and how
they affect the differences in the selection equation coefficients. Alas, these
remain assumptions. Thus, there seems to be a benefit of a directed sur-
vey into the reserved wage equation of the labour market participants and
unemployed, in context of this research.
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Table 2.12: QR for immigrant women, dependant variable: log
hourly wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : q15
schooling 0.077∗∗ (0.009)
tenure 0.002 (0.005)
age -0.027 (0.030)
age squared 0.001 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.240 (0.173)
Intercept 1.051∗ (0.440)
Equation 2 : q25
schooling 0.071∗∗ (0.008)
tenure 0.006 (0.005)
age 0.016 (0.024)
age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.083 (0.214)
Intercept 0.519 (0.480)
Equation 3 : q35
schooling 0.053∗∗ (0.007)
tenure 0.014∗ (0.007)
age 0.036 (0.036)
age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.509∗ (0.236)
Intercept 0.311 (0.670)
Equation 4 : q45
schooling 0.025† (0.013)
tenure 0.005 (0.008)
age -0.028 (0.056)
age squared 0.001 (0.001)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.189 (0.238)
Intercept 1.935† (1.121)
Equation 5 : q50
schooling 0.023† (0.013)
tenure 0.004 (0.007)
age -0.038 (0.052)
age squared 0.001 (0.001)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.155 (0.223)
Intercept 2.157∗ (1.074)
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.12 continued
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 6 : q55
schooling 0.014 (0.012)
tenure -0.002 (0.005)
age -0.040 (0.040)
age squared 0.001 (0.001)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.028 (0.222)
Intercept 2.382∗∗ (0.831)
Equation 7 : q65
schooling 0.025∗ (0.011)
tenure -0.006 (0.006)
age -0.037 (0.031)
age squared 0.001 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) -0.269 (0.309)
Intercept 2.404∗∗ (0.608)
Equation 8 : q75
schooling 0.029∗∗ (0.011)
tenure 0.009 (0.008)
age -0.003 (0.030)
age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.000 (0.433)
Intercept 1.790∗∗ (0.517)
Equation 9 : q85
schooling 0.034∗∗ (0.007)
tenure 0.010† (0.005)
age -0.006 (0.030)
age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Mills ratio (immi) 0.000 (0.214)
Intercept 1.901∗∗ (0.508)
N 522
Log-likelihood .
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 2.13: QR for native women, dependant variable: log hourly
wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : q15
schooling 0.046∗∗ (0.004)
tenure 0.011∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.006 (0.006)
age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.000 (0.137)
Intercept 1.014∗∗ (0.170)
Equation 2 : q25
schooling 0.051∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.009∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.044∗∗ (0.006)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) -0.038 (0.076)
Intercept 0.332∗ (0.136)
Equation 3 : q35
schooling 0.053∗∗ (0.002)
tenure 0.014∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.056∗∗ (0.005)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.111 (0.089)
Intercept 0.100 (0.095)
Equation 4 : q45
schooling 0.053∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.012∗∗ (0.001)
age 0.065∗∗ (0.007)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) -0.004 (0.080)
Intercept 0.084 (0.151)
Equation 5 : q50
schooling 0.055∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.013∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.061∗∗ (0.007)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) -0.020 (0.096)
Intercept 0.169 (0.134)
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.13 continued
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 6 : q55
schooling 0.060∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.013∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.062∗∗ (0.005)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.024 (0.105)
Intercept 0.054 (0.120)
Equation 7 : q65
schooling 0.067∗∗ (0.002)
tenure 0.014∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.066∗∗ (0.005)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.141† (0.084)
Intercept -0.063 (0.112)
Equation 8 : q75
schooling 0.073∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.017∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.060∗∗ (0.006)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.492∗∗ (0.082)
Intercept -0.106 (0.149)
Equation 9 : q85
schooling 0.068∗∗ (0.003)
tenure 0.016∗∗ (0.002)
age 0.067∗∗ (0.006)
age squared -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Mills ratio (nat) 0.513∗∗ (0.061)
Intercept -0.105 (0.129)
N 9356
Log-likelihood .
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Chapter 3
Informational effects of
migration on trade
3.1 Introduction
By virtue of links to their home countries, they [immigrants]
may realize lower costs associated with foreign trade and thereby
be more likely to trade than non-immigrants.
Head and Ries [1998]
Regions within one country tend to trade much more with each other
than with similar regions across a border [McCallum, 1995]. A simple gravity
equation of trade, where trade depends on the size of trading partners and
the distance between them, fits trade patterns very well, but cannot explain
this particular fact.
Head and Ries [1998] proposed that informational costs can explain part
of this “puzzle” and that immigration can facilitate the transmission of this
information. A trading company needs to know the tastes and product char-
acteristics in different countries, and migrants possess superior knowledge
of foreign market conditions [Gould, 1994, Head and Ries, 1998].
There are three broad channels through which (im)migration is suggested
to affect trade: (1) information transmission (i.e., when migrants carry with
them knowledge of trading opportunities in their home countries), (2) con-
tract enforcement (i.e., when members of one ethnic group prefer to deal
with each other in inter-national contracting because of high inter-group
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trust or punishment possibilities), and (3) preference-driven demand cre-
ation (i.e., when a new migrant creates demand for goods from his home
country).
There are many studies that find positive correlation between bilateral
trade flows and the aggregate number of immigrants from the trading part-
ners, for different countries [Gould, 1994, Wagner et al., 2002, Rauch and
Trindade, 2002, are just some of the studies]. While it is clear how the de-
mand creation channel works, the process of information transmission and
contract enforcement can not be elucidated through these studies due to
four major reasons:
1. First of all, there can be reverse causality in the immigration–trade
relationship. It can be argued that goods traded carry information
about countries, and this information influences the decision of mi-
grants to move. If so, then immigration effect on trade from a simple
regression of trade on same-year stock of immigrants will be biased
upward. This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to use the lagged
immigration variable to instrument for the current immigrant stock to
get a more reliable estimate.
2. Second, immigrant heterogeneity is not taken into account—current
studies use the aggregate number of immigrants to obtain estimates of
the average immigrant effect on trade. As immigrants differ with re-
spect to their labour market involvement in the host country, however,
the average effect has little meaning.
As an exception, Head and Ries [1998] do differentiate between differ-
ent immigrant categories, but only the categories that migrants sort
themselves into while entering the country, e.g., family reunification,
independent, entrepreneur, refugee. This cannot measure what immi-
grants do in the labour market after they enter the country, which is
of much higher importance for trade. The present paper investigates
the importance of different groups of migrants.
3. Third, not all goods’ trade requires information transmission in the
same way, and while almost all studies distinguish between simple and
complex goods [see, e.g., Gould, 1994, Rauch and Trindade, 2002],
no study utilises finer data on trade. If such data is available, dis-
tinguishing between different sub-classes of complex goods (e.g., end
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goods versus goods that serve as inputs into other goods’ production)
helps to further highlight a role an immigrant plays in facilitating
trade. The present paper develops this direction further.
4. Finally, the information and contract-enforcement channels may only
be two of many alternative consistent explanations for the correlation
of the total stock of immigrants and bilateral trade flows of a country.
One other possible explanation could be that migrants are a proxy for
some third confounding factor, say, a general knowledge of the host
country in the immigrant home country (and vice versa), and this
confounding factor affects both migration and trade, with no causal
effect between these two.
Due to the data availability issues, the previous studies tried to deal
with this problem in a number of indirect ways: Girma and Yu [2002]
distinguish between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth immi-
grants to the UK, to control for similar institutional factors, which
are just a subset of the knowledge stock; Gould [1994] uses country
fixed effects, but at the cost of increasing the ‘noise to information’
ratio and thus biasing the estimates [see Griliches, 1986, Wagner et al.,
2002, for discussion]; Girma and Yu [2002] and Rauch and Trindade
[2002] control for same language between countries, although again,
language can only capture a part of the “knowledge” stock, in partic-
ular missing all the information on the countries whose citizens do not
speak the same language but share a lot in common through history,
such as Austria and Hungary.
The present paper proposes a more direct measure of the “knowledge”
factor.
In this paper, I want to concentrate only on the Information Trans-
mission and Contract Enforcement channels (amalgamated into the IT-CE
channel, for both have the same implications for immigration–trade link).
The preference-driven demand creation is more straightforward to under-
stand. In addition, it affects primarily imports of the goods from the mi-
grant’s home country into his host country, as opposed to IT-CE, which
affects flows in both directions.
To highlight the IT-CE channel and to abstract away from the demand
channel, I use only the trade flows from the immigrants’ host region to their
58 CHAPTER 3. MIGRATION AND TRADE
home region, called “exports” in the rest of the paper. The host regions
in this case are German Bundesla¨nder, and the home regions are various
trading partner countries of these Bundesla¨nder.
I start the analysis with a standard log-linear equation used in the lit-
erature: a log of host Bundesland–to–home country exports is regressed on
a log of migrants from that home country living in that host Bundesland;
other co-variates are also included [see, e.g., Head and Ries, 1998, Rauch and
Trindade, 2002, etc.]. This specification assumes constant elasticity for the
effect of immigrant stock on exports. Next, I introduce four innovations in
the research on the immigrant–trade link, compared to the earlier literature:
First of all, I use the lagged immigration variable as an instrument for
immigration. Apart from econometric reasoning (to exclude reverse causal-
ity), this is motivated by the necessary lag of an immigrant’s potential effect
on trade after the date of immigration: it is likely to take a year to set up
a trading business.
Second, I differentiate between the sub-groups of immigrants (from the
same home country) based on their labour market status in the host region,
since not all immigrants have the same effect on exports. In particular, an
immigrant company manager is more likely to utilise his knowledge of his
home market in setting up a trading opportunity than, say, a fruit picker.
This paper is the first to use such detailed data (from German micro-census)
on the migrant labour-market participation—the data is presented in detail
in section 3.2.4.
Third, the present paper distinguishes between different types of ex-
ports, similar to Gould [1994] and Rauch and Trindade [2002]. However,
unlike past studies that concentrated on producer/consumer or homoge-
nous/differentiated goods dichotomies, I utilise finer disaggregation level to
distinguish, for instance, between non-industrial goods and raw materials, or
between raw materials, semi-finished goods, and finished input goods. This
leads to understanding of which groups of migrants are relevant for which
trade, with a greater level of precision.
Last, I propose a proxy for the “confounding factor” that could explain
both immigration and trade. This is the most tentative contribution, due
to the data limitations, but it confirms the main theme of the paper that
only certain immigrants matter and only for certain good types.
I hypothesise that in the case of Germany, both trade and migration
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can be explained by some general level of information about Germany in
its trading partner countries, and I use information on German diplomatic
missions abroad to investigate this question. Introducing a proxy for this
information level indeed decreases the coefficient of immigrant variables by
as much as 32 percent.
The evidence found in this paper supports the information and the con-
tract enforcement hypotheses, finds no evidence for dominance of alternative
hypotheses of immigrant–trade link, and sharpens the estimated coefficient
values of the immigrant–trade elasticities:
• The control regression produces similar elasticity to those found in the
literature: 0.147.1 Using lags of immigrant stock as instruments for
immigration leads to the reduction of estimates by 12 to 16 percent.
This means that the estimates in the past studies are likely biased
upwards.
• Distinguishing immigrants by what they do in the labour market pro-
duces elasticities of 0.294 for (EU) white-collar versus 0.127 for (EU)
blue-collar workers, for example. This sharpens the distinction be-
tween migrant types.
• Controlling for different product types further highlights the effect of
immigrants in the markets for complex, information-intensive goods.2
Consistent with predictions, I find, for example, that (EU) white-collar
workers have a strong above-average influence on the industrial end
product and complex input product trade, and no effect at all for
non-industrial goods.
• Controlling for the “knowledge” about Germany abroad reduces the
elasticity of the blue-collar workers further, but the elasticity of the
(EU) white-collar workers remains significantly larger than average.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the
IT-CE story, the empirical approach to testing it, and the data. Section
1This is close to the estimates in the literature: between 0.129 from Head and Ries
[1998] and 0.160 from Girma and Yu [2002].
2These results are qualitatively similar to the rest of the literature [see, e.g., Gould,
1994, Rauch and Trindade, 2002]. Unlike the rest of the literature, this paper utilises finer
product categories, to distinguish between the end products and input products within
the group of industrial products, for example.
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3.3.1 presents the results of the general regression with aggregate immigrant
stock and all exports: this repeats the approach taken in the literature,
for comparison purposes, and introduces the results with lagged immigra-
tion variable. Section 3.3.2 introduces the second innovation: it repeats the
analysis of section 3.3.1, controlling for the differences in immigrant partic-
ipation in the labour market. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 repeat the analysis
of sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, this time distinguishing between the types of
exports and with a proxy for third factors, respectively, to further clarify
the IT-CE story of the link between immigration and trade. Finally, section
3.4 concludes.
3.2 Set-up
3.2.1 The migrant story
In this paper, I eschew the preference-driven demand creation story of the
immigration–trade link. This channel is very simple and yet may suffer
from various complications. A large immigrant group may practice import
substitution, meaning negative correlation between immigrant stock and
trade; this can be size-dependent. To avoid this sort of effect, I only study
exports from the host region to the home country of the immigrants.
The intuitive explanation of how immigrants may affect trade is simple:
an immigrant, due to his experience in both his host and home countries,
possesses superior knowledge of supply and demand in his home and host
countries, and is thus able to utilise this comparative advantage vis-a´-vis a
local, to realise a potential trading opportunity. This view of immigrants-
as-carriers of information is exemplified in the opening quotation.
Another view, that of contract enforcement, has similar structure: immi-
grants may prefer to deal with those within their ethnic or national group,
which allows them a higher level of trust or higher punishment possibili-
ties (through within-group pressure) for renegade behaviour. This is well
presented in Rauch [2001] and Rauch and Trindade [2002], who study eth-
nic Chinese networks around the world and find evidence for higher trade
between countries with higher proportions of ethnic Chinese minorities.
But immigrants are heterogeneous in their potential effect on trade. Take
the three largest groups of working migrants that can potentially affect trade
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in any country: blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and self-employed.3
If the IT-CE story is correct, we would expect blue-collar workers to have
a small effect on exports: they are not likely to influence the decision of a
company, and therefore not likely to utilise their potential information of
foreign contacts.
We would expect the self-employed immigrants to have stronger effect
than blue-collar workers, because they can set up trading businesses. How-
ever, a lot of immigrant self-employed are in non-exporting service indus-
tries. For example, nearly a third of all self-employed migrants (27.7%) is
in the hotel and restaurant industry. As a group, then, it is unclear if the
self-employed have stronger or weaker influence on exports than blue-collar
workers.
While self-employed (with or without employees) are heads of their own
companies, white-collar workers may be further removed from the decision-
making of their respective companies, but still closer to the decision-making
than blue-collar workers. On the other hand, white-collar workers could be
employed in larger companies than self-employed entrepreneurs. Further-
more, white-collar workers are well represented in international businesses,
unlike the self-employed. A priori, due to this trade-off (smaller influence in
larger and international companies), it is impossible to say whether white-
collar workers have a stronger potential effect on exports than self-employed,
but the expectation is that the second effect dominates. We can also expect
white-collar workers to have larger effect than blue-collar workers.
To further highlight the channels through which immigrants are able to
affect exports, consider different types of goods. For simple commodities
(e.g., wheat, steel) or simple non-industrial products (e.g., some foodstuffs),
we would expect zero effect of immigrant-carried information: the price of a
commodity alone sends the necessary signal. Thus, if the IT-CE story is the
relevant one, we would expect no significant difference in effects of all three
groups of immigrants on Bundesland exports of raw materials (e.g., iron
ore) and non-industrial goods (e.g., foodstuffs). In fact, for these product
types and all the immigrant groups, we would expect no significant effect
whatsoever.
For complex goods, on the other hand, the price does not reflect all the
3Trainees and family workers are further groups in my dataset, but they can be ignored
as they are not likely to affect exports. The same goes for unemployed.
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necessary information. Thus, we would expect a stronger-than-average effect
of white-collar immigrants on trade in complex industrial products (such as
semi-finished and finished goods), and zero effect of blue-collar workers on
trade in the same product groups.
This discussion sets up the stage for empirical investigation into the rel-
ative effects of different groups of migrants, on different groups of products,
and through this into clarifying the different hypotheses of the link between
trade and immigrants.
3.2.2 Gravity model
To test the relationship between exports and immigration, I start with an
empirical gravity model of trade, which also encompasses immigrant stocks
as an explanatory variable.4 This model assumes constant elasticity of im-
migration on trade (η):5
lnXij = α+ η · ln Immiij + β1 · lnDistij
+ β2 · lnGDP j + β3 · lnGDP i + βZ · Zij, (3.1)
where Xij is the export from host Bundesland i to immigrant home country
j; Immiij is the immigrant stock from country j in Bundesland i; Distij is
the distance between the capital cities of Bundesland i and country j; GDP j
and GDP i are the home country and host Bundesland GDP measures; Zij
is a vector of additional controls used in the literature—these are described
in section 3.2.4.6
For comparison purposes, equation (3.1) is very similar to those in the
4“Gravity” refers to the fact that bigger and closer countries trade more with each
other. There are different approaches to derive a theoretically-driven gravity equation
from a general equilibrium model of trade [see, e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003,
Bergstrand, 1985]. However, utilising these models is data-consuming due to their general
equilibrium nature. Given the data limitations, and in particular inability to obtain
detailed data on Germans abroad, the approach taken here is a simpler gravity-style
model, which is very similar to Head and Ries [1998] and Wagner et al. [2002].
5Some authors proposed models with diminishing (export) returns to immigration [see,
e.g., Gould, 1994]. It is a priori not clear which model is best. However, for the comparison
to the most of the literature and in the absence of hard arguments against it, the linear
model is a good choice. Of course, the particular type of the model is an assumption. At
least for the relationship between size of the trading partners and the distance between
them, the model is also consistent with theory, as mentioned above.
6The results reported below are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of various Z-
variables, such as GDP per capita.
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literature [see, e.g., Wagner et al., 2002]. I modify this equation in several
ways to take account of the innovations of this paper:
First, I modify equation (3.1) to utilise the disaggregated information
on immigrant employment, which is taken from the German micro-census.
To do this, I follow Head and Ries [1998] in decomposing the elasticity η
from equation (3.1) into the base elasticity ηb and additional elasticities θ’s,
dependent on the employment group, such that an export elasticity for a
country j is then:
ηj = ηb+ηeub ·EU +θs ·Sjs +θw ·Sjw +θeus ·EU ·Sjs +θeuw ·EU ·Sjw, (3.2)
where ηb is the export elasticity for a non-EU country, whose immigrants
into Germany were entirely blue-collar workers, and ηeub is the additional
effect of EU blue-collar migrants; Sjs and S
j
w are respectively the shares
of self-employed and white-collar immigrants among the total population
of immigrants from a country j in Germany; EU is the EU dummy; θs,
θw, θeus and θeuw are the added effects of self-employed, white-collar, and
additionally EU self-employed and white-collar immigrants, respectively.
Depending on the make-up of immigrants from country j in Germany and
whether the immigrant home country is in the EU, the additional elasticities
θ’s are added to the base elasticity ηb to obtain the total elasticity of j-
originated immigration on j-destined exports. Example 3.1 helps to clarify
this:
Example 3.1 If all immigrants from country j were white-collar immi-
grants, the share of white collars would be Sjw = 1, and the elasticity would
therefore be ηj = ηb + θw if country j were not an EU country, and it would
be ηj = ηb + ηeub + θw + θeuw if country j were an EU country.
In this case, instead of just ln Immiij , the variables of interest are
ln Immiij, Sjs × ln Immiij and Sjw × ln Immiij . If η from equation (3.1)
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is substituted with ηj from equation (3.2), the new model then becomes:7
lnXij = α+ ηb ln Immi
ij + ηeubEU ln Immi
ij
+ θsS
j
s ln Immi
ij + θwS
j
w ln Immi
ij
+ θeusEU · Sjs ln Immiij + θeuwEU · Sjw ln Immiij
+ β1 lnDist
ij + β2 lnGDP
j + β3 lnGDP
i
+ βZ · Zij. (3.3)
Within the context of equation (3.3), the expectation is that the white-
collar variables have significant positive coefficients; since these coefficients
have to be added to the coefficient of the base group of migrants (blue-collar
workers) to get the elasticity of exports, this would mean that the influence of
white-collar workers on trade is higher than that of blue-collar workers. The
blue-collar and self-employed effect is not a priori clear, given the amount
of blue-collar influence in any company and the amount of self-employed in
non-trading industries.
The effect of EU versus non-EU immigrants on trade is also not a priori
clear: On the one hand, it is assumed that within the EU, the “normal”
IT-CE mechanisms should work well, such that the immigrant networks are
of limited additional value in this respect. On the other hand, German EU-
destined exports have larger (than non-EU exports) share of semi-finished
goods and finished goods that act as inputs into further production, indicat-
ing higher share of within-firm trade (or outsourcing)—and trade in these
goods requires more intensive information transmission and more trust than
trade in simpler goods, such that the scope for within-EU immigrant-related
IT-CE can be higher.
To sum up the expectation on the signs of the immigrant group coeffi-
cients in different scenarios:
Hypothesis 3.1 Assume the IT-CE hypothesis as the relevant immigrant–
trade mechanism. If all exports are treated the same, and if the “confounding
factors” are not controlled for, expect the following from the model in equa-
tion (3.3):
7For the more detailed job descriptions, the elasticity decomposition looks identical, but
with the following variables: manual non-agriculture workers serve as the base; workers
in agriculture, engineering, technical jobs, sales, banking, local transport, other trans-
port, office jobs, security, journalistic jobs, health professionals, social workers, and other
workers. Again, the EU-interaction terms are included.
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• θw and θeuw should be positive and significant,
• ηb, θs and θeus cannot be signed,
• ηeub and θeus cannot be signed, but ηeub should be significantly smaller
than θeuw.
• If the lagged immigration variable is used, expect the size of the base
elasticity to decline.
Typically, this is the place at which the analysis is repeated for dif-
ferent product types. Typically, these product types are either consumer
and producer goods [Gould, 1994] or homogenous and differentiated prod-
ucts [Rauch and Trindade, 2002]. The present paper goes beyond these
dichotomies and looks at much finer product classes, given by:
List 3.1 (Product types used) (1) Non-industrial products, (2) indus-
trial goods (including raw materials, semi-finished and finished products),
(21) raw materials, (22) semi-finished products, (23) finished products (in-
cluding input and end products), (231) (finished) input products, (232) end
products, (22+231) goods that serve in another product’s production process
(semi-finished products plus inputs).8
If the IT-CE hypothesis is correct, we would expect the white-collar immi-
grants to have stronger effect the more complex an exported good is. If the
self-employed immigrant effect on exports is above average, expect it also to
become stronger with the complexity of a good. The effect of the blue-collar
workers should be less than the white-collar effect.
Hypothesis 3.2 Assume that everything is as in Hypothesis 3.1, except
suppose that the exports are distinguished by the sub-groups given in List
3.1. Then, in equation (3.3) expect:
• θw and θeuw (and θs and θeus if larger than average) should be larger
(and positive) the more complicated the product group is: i.e., close to
zero for non-industrial products and raw materials, positive and big-
ger for finished products, and somewhere in-between for semi-finished
products,9
8This categorisation is given by Statistisches Bundesamt (German Statistical Office).
9Since these coefficients come from different regressions with different dependent vari-
ables, we cannot test their respective sizes against each other, but we would expect the
differences in sizes to show, nevertheless.
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• ηb, θs and θeus cannot be signed,
• ηeub and θeus cannot be signed, but ηeub should be significantly smaller
than θeuw, the more complex an exported product is.
3.2.3 Confounding factors
Finally, we can address the confounding factor critique. Suppose that the
effect of the blue-collar workers turns out to be positive, significant, and
large compared to other immigrant groups: this cannot be explained by the
IT-CE hypothesis. One reason for this could be that it picks up an effect
of some unobservable factor, a stock of “knowledge” in one country about
the other, which affects both migration and trade.10 Suppose that the true
model is:
lnXij = α+ γ1 ln Immi
ij + γ2K
ij + β1 lnDist
ij
+ β2 lnGDP
j + β3 lnGDP
i + βZ · Zij, (3.4)
where Kij is the knowledge of Bundesland i in country j, and the rest is as
in Equation (3.1).
Equation (3.4) assumes that immigration carries the knowledge of coun-
try j into Bundesland i, but trade is also affected by the knowledge of i in
j—this is captured in the variable Kij. In this case, since migration from
j to i is likely correlated with Kij, the estimate of η from Equation (3.1)
will pick up the joint effect γ1 + f(γ2) from the true model in Equation
(3.4), where f(γ2) captures the effect via migration of the knowledge stock
on exports. If γ1 = 0 in reality, this will not be identified through η.
I attempt to proxy these unobservable Kij with the number of German
diplomatic missions (in logs) in the home country of a given immigrant
group. There inevitably will be some collinearity between the immigration
variable ln Immiij and the diplomatic missions variable Kij, which will lead
to increased variance of the estimates of γ1 and γ2 (i.e., less precision). The
upshot is the reduction of bias. Once there is a proxy for Kij , we would
10Of course, there can be other confounding factors, but the “stock of knowledge” is
general enough to encompass most of them. Deeper investigation is worthwhile, but this
warrants a separate article. We shall treat the exercise here as just an example of potential
confounding factors. The main goal is to see if the coefficients on immigration variables
decline or stay unchanged.
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expect the coefficient of the blue-collar group—i.e., the “irrelevant” migrant
group—to diminish in size.
Furthermore, the effect of white-collar group could also disappear. This
would be a strong signal that the IT-CE hypothis is wrong, and the relevant
effect comes purely from this “third” factor. We sum up the hypothesis
thus:
Hypothesis 3.3 Assume that everything is as in Hypothesis 3.2, except
now introduce a proxy for the third “confounding” factor, such as the abstract
stock of knowledge in one country about the other. Then, expect a decrease
in the value and significance of the immigrant effect on exports, compared
to the results of Equations (3.1) and (3.3).
Before we move onto the results, one point has to be made. I do not in-
clude other potential confounding factors like common language or language
distance, that have been mentioned in the trade literature. It would be a
valuable addition to our understanding to combine all the potential factors
in one regression, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. I do, how-
ever, control for some factors common to EU and non-EU countries through
dummies.
3.2.4 The data
Each data point is an export flow from a particular German Bundesland to a
particular country or a country grouping in a particular year, together with
explanatory variables that fit this Bundesland–country–year profile. The
choice of countries and country groupings was dictated by the information on
the immigrants, obtained from anonymised German micro-censuses of 1996,
1997, and 1998: while the export data was available for each Bundesland
and each country in the world, the immigrant groups in German data are
sometimes highly aggregated. Table 3.1 gives the list of all countries and
country groupings in the sample.
I chose the years 1996, 1997, and 1998 due to a relatively quiet period
of the world history at that time, such that there will be as little noise as
possible from wars and refugees in the immigrant data. Nevertheless, it
turns out to be difficult to draw firm conclusions from the data on non-EU
migrants exactly for the reason that they are dominated by the refugees
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Table 3.1: Countries and country groups in the sample
Austria Bosnia-Herzegovina
GB Croatia
Greece Serbia & Montenegro
France CIS
Italy Poland
Netherlands Romania
Portugal Slovak Rep, Czech Rep, Hungary
Spain Turkey
other EU other Europe
Morocco other Africa
USA other America
Iran other Middle East
Vietnam other South Asia
East Asia
NOTE: “other EU” means: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxem-
burg, Sweden; “other Europe”: Switzerland, other CEE, other West Europe;
“Other Middle East”: e.g., Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Israel; “Other
South Asia”: e.g., Afghanistan, India, Cambodia, Lao, Pakistan, Thailand,
Sri Lanka; “East Asia”: e.g., China, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Macao, Philippines
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from ex-Yugoslavia, for example, and refugees are not expected to influence
exports.
Because the lags of immigrant stocks are used, my regressions are pooled
regressions for 1997 and 1998 only, with clustering option for standard errors
to take account of the same countries present in both years. Any differencing
technique would have resulted in no information from the distance, so this is
not typically done in spatial trade modelling. The resulting coefficients are
the result of cross-country heterogeneity; time dimension plays little role.
In the regressions based on equations (3.1)–(3.4), I use the following
variables:
Xij the export from host Bundesland i to immigrant home country j in a
given year. The Bundesland-specific export is any good that has its
last production stage in that Bundesland, and not an export of the
Bundesland with the headquarters of the producing company. So, for
example, a Sachsen-produced Mercedes car exported to Poland is an
export of Sachsen, and not of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, even though the
headquarters of Daimler-Benz is in Stuttgart.
Immiij the immigrant stock from country j in Bundesland i in a given year11
Distij the distance in kilometres between the capital city of Bundesland i
and the capital of country j12
GDP j the home country GDP
GDP i the host Bundesland GDP
Zij includes: home country and host Bundesland GDP per capita in logs,13
home country price level in logs (a representative country is taken in
a region where more than one country is present), the average years
of education in the immigrant group in logs (from country j in Bun-
desland i), EU dummy.
11These were obtained from the micro-censuses. Since the micro-census samples only
about 500,000 people out of the total population of over 81 million, the numbers from
micro-censuses were then scaled up in proportion to the total population in Germany in
a given year to achieve the total numbers of migrants in each occupation.
12This is road distance if in the same continent (obtained from www.map24.de), or a
geographical shortest arc distance, if on different continents; a representative country is
taken in a grouping of many countries: refer to Appendix A.1 for more details.
13These were constructed from the GDP data and the population data.
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All the German-specific data is obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt
(German Statistical Office): exports, population, German Bundesla¨nder
GDP, and the immigrant numbers from the micro-censuses.
The country GDP, population, price levels were obtained from Penn
World Tables, 6.0, and from IMF in case of Angola and Libya (data missing
from PWT).
Some summary statistics are presented in Appendix A.1.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Base regression and the lag question
Table 3.2 presents results of the equation (3.1) in four different variants:
regression A includes the log of all immigrants in the same year as the
exports—this corresponds to the regression used in the literature [see, e.g.,
Wagner et al., 2002]. Note the implied immigration elasticity of exports:
0.147. This lies between 0.129 found in Head and Ries [1998] and 0.160 in
Girma and Yu [2002], and is comparable to other elasticities in the literature
[see Wagner et al., 2002]. All of the other coefficients have expected signs.
Regression A lag is the same but uses the lagged immigration stock—
notice the drop of 12% in the immigration elasticity η, from 0.147 to 0.130
[c.f. 0.129 in Wagner et al., 2002].
Regression B is the same as A except that the immigrant stock has the
following groups deleted: trainees, family workers, and unemployed or those
with missing observations on their labour-market involvement. Since the
dropped groups were not likely to affect trade, it is not surprising to see
the coefficient of the remaining immigrants increase from 0.147 to 0.154.14
Regression B lag is the same as B but with the lagged immigration stock—
again, the coefficient drops by about 16% to 0.129.
Before going further, let us discuss the choice to include the lagged vari-
able. On the economics side, this is motivated by the natural lag between
a decision of an immigrant to set-up an export business and exports. This
is especially true if the immigrants are new. However, the year of entry
14There is a more prosaic explanation for this increase, too. There are many immigrants
with missing occupation in the data: these migrants enter the immigrant stock in regres-
sions A but not in B. The stock of migrants thus decreases from average of 85,607 for all
Bundesla¨nder to 12,804, which must be reflected in the higher coefficient in regressions B.
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into Germany is missing from my dataset. Thus, the lagged variable cannot
distinguish between new immigrants in the previous year (relevant for the
following year’s exports) and those immigrants that may leave the country
the following year (irrelevant for same exports).
On the econometrics side, the lagged immigration stock is nevertheless
a good instrument for the current immigration stock. This rules out reverse
causality, since this year’s exports are not likely to influence last year’s immi-
gration,15 even if they can potentially influence the same year’s immigration
(through transmitting information of their own).
Taking these two issues into account, we cannot be sure which approach
is the right one. I provide both results throughout, for comparison. The
qualitative results are the same for both, yet the lagged regressions give lower
estimates for the immigration effect. This might indicate that some form of
endogeneity exists, and the results in the literature are biased upwards.
Next, I investigate the differences in the immigrants’ involvement in the
labour market, and their influences on exports.
Table 3.2: Dependent variable: logX; all non-dummy variables are in logs;
regression A uses all immigrants in the same year as exports, regression A
lag is the same but with lags; regression B uses only blue-collar, white-collar
and self-employed immigrants in the same year as exports, regression B lag
is the same but with lags
Variable (coef) A A lag B B lag
Immigrant stock (η) 0.147∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.129∗∗
GDP in home country 0.805∗∗ 0.807∗∗ 0.803∗∗ 0.808∗∗
GDP in host Bundesl. 0.929∗∗ 0.930∗∗ 0.932∗∗ 0.935∗∗
GDP per cap in home 0.443∗∗ 0.434∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 0.434∗∗
GDP per cap in host 0.769∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.740∗∗ 0.693∗∗
price level −0.852∗∗ −0.865∗∗ −0.860∗∗ −0.870∗∗
distance −0.767∗∗ −0.776∗∗ −0.764∗∗ −0.782∗∗
Intercept −29.959∗∗ −29.050∗∗ −29.730∗∗ −28.933∗∗
N 687 669 682 664
R2 0.9 0.901 0.901 0.901
F 522.29 534.549 527.78 536.862
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
15This is an assumption, but one that is plausible.
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3.3.2 Occupations of immigrants
Table 3.3 presents the results of two versions of regression in equation (3.3):
regression C uses same-year immigrant stock, while regression C lag uses
lagged immigrant stock. In both regressions, immigrant stock contains
only blue-collar, white-collar workers and self-employed. Blue-collar non-
EU workers (denoted in the table as “blue-collar”) offer the base effect, and
to get the elasticity of all other groups (white-collar or self-employed non-
EU migrants, or any of the three EU migrant groups), one has to add the
relevant coefficients to the base blue-collar coefficient.
Table 3.3: Dependent variable: logX; all non-dummy variables are in logs;
self-employed and white-collar worker variables are actually shares of self-
employed and white-collar workers in Germany from the trading partner
countries, times the log of total immigrant stock from the same countries in
individual Bundesla¨nder, and the blue-collar worker (base) variable is log of
this total immigrant stock; regression C uses only blue-collar, white-collar
and self-employed immigrants in the same year as exports, regression C lag
is the same but with lags
Variable C C lag
blue-collar (ηb) 0.203
∗∗ 0.178∗∗
self-employed (θs) −0.187 −0.044
white-collar (θw) −0.089 −0.081
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.076† −0.070
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.158 −0.512∗
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.256∗∗ 0.274∗∗
EU fixed effect −0.241 0.057
GDP in home country 0.787∗∗ 0.804∗∗
GDP in host Bundesland 0.929∗∗ 0.924∗∗
GDP per cap in home country 0.613∗∗ 0.549∗∗
GDP per cap in host Bundesland 0.738∗∗ 0.679∗∗
price level −0.968∗∗ −0.969∗∗
distance −0.684∗∗ −0.747∗∗
Intercept −30.849∗∗ −29.412∗∗
N 682 664
R2 0.907 0.908
F 296.091 305.225
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
In regression C, EU blue-collar workers have a borderline significant neg-
ative coefficient, EU self-employed have negative and insignificant coefficient,
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and white-collar workers from the EU countries have positive and significant
coefficient. Once added to the base coefficient, this indicates that the export
elasticity from EU white-collar workers (0.294 = 0.203−0.089−0.076+0.256)
is significantly higher than the base export elasticity (0.203), as well as the
elasticity from EU blue-collar workers (0.127 = 0.203− 0.076), as predicted.
However, export elasticity of EU self-employed cannot be distinguished
from that of EU blue-collar workers, using a Wald test. It is, however,
possible to reject the equality of the EU white-collar coefficient and the EU
self-employed coefficient, using a Wald test (with a 90% confidence).
In regression C lag, we see the same pattern. The individual coefficients
change, however: the base coefficient declines from 0.203 to 0.178, while the
EU white-collar coefficient increases from 0.256 to 0.274. Adding the base
coefficient, the white-collar coefficient and EU interaction terms’ coefficients
gives a new EU white-collar elasticity of 0.301 (a slight increase from 0.294).
This is consistent with the hypothesis that blue-collar coefficient captures
some potential reverse causality effect from trade to migration, while white-
collar elasticity should indicate the hypothesised above-average causal effect.
The lower-than-average self-employed effect is consistent with the over-
representation of immigrant self-employed in non-exporting service indus-
tries. As mentioned before, nearly a third of all self-employed migrants
(27.7%) is in the hotel and restaurant industry.
Interestingly, both regressions show significant base effect, which cor-
responds to the non-EU blue-collar worker elasticity. The EU blue-collar
elasticity is lower than that of non-EU blue-collar workers (0.127 to 0.203
in regression C). However, this difference is only borderline significant in
regression C and not at all in regression C lag.
More importantly, the EU white-collar effect is significantly higher than
that of non-EU white-collar immigrants. This difference might have the
following explanations:
First, if the IT-CE hypothesis is correct, the drastic difference between
EU and non-EU white-collar workers might hint towards the prevalence
of different types of goods exported to the EU and non-EU countries. In
extreme, if all non-EU-destined exports of Germany were raw materials,
their trade would not require much information other than price—and thus,
no room for non-EU white-collar immigrants. On the other hand, when all
EU-destined exports are complex inputs into the production of another good
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abroad, this requires personal contacts and collaboration.
The German Bundesla¨nder exports of complex inputs into other produc-
tion are in fact higher for the EU than non-EU (including non-EU industrial
nations): for Bavaria, for example, the share of “semi-finished” goods from
all exports is 0.056 for the EU, and 0.019 for the non-EU countries (including
0.020 for developing nations and 0.0186 for other developed nations).
Second, the EU–non-EU immigrant coefficients difference may also hint
on the relative non-importance of differences in institutional factors: If the
institutional differences were important, we would expect the without-EU
export elasticity of migrants to be larger than within the EU, since within the
EU the institutions do not differ as much—thus, there would be less room for
IT-CE. Furthermore, if the institutional factors were important, we would
expect a positive and significant coefficient for the EU dummy. However,
the EU dummy is insignificant in both C and C lag regressions, and the
within-EU immigrants have stronger white-collar effect. This contrasts to
the findings of a UK study with Commonwealth versus non-Commonwealth
migrants, where a strong “non-Commonwealth” effect is found [Girma and
Yu, 2002].
I now turn to disaggregated export data to see if anything more can be
said about the “non-EU puzzle”, among other things.
3.3.3 Finer trade
This section looks at the evidence of immigrant influence for various disag-
gregated export flows. The analysis in this section only includes the Bun-
desla¨nder, which are hosts to the largest immigrant populations (e.g., BW),
and/or have large export volumes (e.g., Hamburg), and for which the trade
data was readily available: Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Hamburg, Hessen, Nieder-
sachsen, and Rheinland-Pfalz.16
Table 3.4 presents the immigration elasticities of exports from equation
(3.1), for the sub-groups of exports given in the List 3.1, for a regression
with contemporary immigrant stocks (D) and a regression with lagged im-
migrant stocks (D lag), both with the reduced numbers of immigrants (i.e.,
without unemployed, trainees, and family workers).17 I also re-estimate the
16Hamburg also has a large percentage of its population as immigrants.
17Note, I present only the estimates of the log of immigrant stock variable, and sup-
press all the other variables, to save space; the left-most column contains the name of a
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elasticity from equation (3.1) for total exports with the reduced sample of
Bundesla¨nder, for comparison. Note the elasticity for total exports chang-
ing from 0.154 or 0.129 and significant, to, respectively, 0.047 and 0.038 and
insignificant (compare with Table 3.2, regressions B and B lag).
Table 3.4: Immigrant effect on dis-aggregated export groups; note: only the
estimates of the log of immigrant stock variable, all the other variables sup-
pressed; the left-most column contains the name of a dependent variable, in
each case; regression D uses only blue-collar, white-collar and self-employed
immigrants in the same year as exports, regression D lag is the same but
with lags; regressions F and F lag are the same, but with the added variable
for German consular missions abroad.
Dep. Variable D D lag F F lag
(1+2) total exports 0.047 0.038 0.032 0.022
(1) non-industrial products −0.038 −0.046 −0.018 −0.026
(2) industrial products 0.066 0.060 0.045 0.039
(21) raw materials 0.032 0.038 0.021 −0.028
(22) semi-finished products 0.011 −0.015 −0.009 −0.037
(23) finished products 0.071 0.067 0.051 0.045
(231) finished input products 0.113∗ 0.119∗ 0.094† 0.100†
(232) end products 0.070 0.065 0.049 0.043
(22+232) process goods 0.084 0.074 0.065 0.053
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Our intuition concerning the information-intensity of certain goods seems
to be correct: industrial goods have a stronger effect from immigration, with
input products and end products having the highest immigrant-induced ef-
fect, while raw materials and non-industrial goods have the smallest. Semi-
finished products effect seems puzzling, but the products that may serve as
inputs into another product’s production (semi-finished goods and finished
input products) together still have a higher immigrant effect than the av-
erage effect across all goods, for both regressions D and D lag (0.084 and
0.074 versus 0.047 and 0.038).
On the other hand, the effects on all categories but one are insignificant:
but the category with the significant effect is input goods, which also has the
strongest effect. This is consistent with the predictions. The strong effect
on input goods indicates immigrant effect on international supply chains,
dependent variable, in each case.
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which arguably requires the most information.18
Now, let us look at Table 3.5, which presents the results of the finer
analysis of the export product categories, taking into account different types
of immigrants (by occupation), again for the restricted choice of immigrant
occupations. Similarly to the above, regression E uses same-year immigrant
stock, and E lag uses the lagged immigrant stock.
For total exports in regression E lag, the base elasticity is only marginal-
ly significant, self-employed have significantly lower elasticity, and no group
other than the EU white-collar migrants has a significantly different elastic-
ity. The EU white collars, however, have a significantly higher elasticity also
for the goods with higher informational content, as hypothesised. For exam-
ple, the only significantly positive elasticity for semi-finished goods comes
from EU white-collar immigrants, and this is consistent with the suggestion
that those occupying important positions in companies utilise their networks
to help their companies to participate in international production chains.
In regression E, the qualitative effects are similar. One notable excep-
tion: EU white-collar effect is marginally more significant for input goods,
and bigger for semi-finished goods. In both regressions, as before, the non-
EU self-employed elasticity is lower than average. Furthermore, the EU
blue-collar workers show positive above-average effect on raw material ex-
ports, which is puzzling.
Overall, it is puzzling that for the biggest Bundesla¨nder with the biggest
immigrant populations and trade, as opposed to all Bundesla¨nder, the total
immigrant effect on total exports becomes insignificant: our intuition would
suggest otherwise. This might be explained by the effect of sample size on
standard errors, since the signs are the same as in regressions C and C lag.
Furthermore, looking at finer categories of immigrants helps to distinguish
between the decision-making group effect and the rest. In particular, the
EU white-collar effect is positive and significantly higher than the average
effect.
One caveat needs to be mentioned, in the case of EU white-collar work-
ers. Even if the lagged numbers are taken, there can still be reverse causal-
ity from future exports to past immigrant numbers if the companies are
forward-looking and this results in hiring managers from the potential ex-
18See, for example, the literature on theory of the firm, and especially on trust and on
complementarities in production.
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port markets. At present, my dataset cannot say anything about this.
Finally, the non-EU white-collar “puzzle” remains, but might be ex-
plained in the following way: The largest non-EU group of migrants in
Germany comes from ex-Yugoslavia. Together, this group is larger than
the German Turkish or Italian populations. There are other refugee groups,
which I cannot account for. The presence of these groups in Germany cannot
be expected to be correlated with German exports to their home countries.
I have tried to account for this by selecting a relatively “quiet” period in
history (1996–1998), but the basic critique while referring to the non-EU
coefficients stays. Such a problem cannot be present within the EU, of
course.
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Table 3.5: Disaggregated trade categories and the effect of
immigrant groups on exports; only the immigrant-related co-
efficients; regression E uses only blue-collar, white-collar and
self-employed immigrants in the same year as exports, re-
gression E lag is the same but with lags; regressions G and
G lag are the same, but with the added variable for Ger-
man consular missions abroad; the numbers in brackets are
predicted elasticities for EU white-collar migrants for some
export groups.
Variable (coef) E E lag G G lag
Dep. variable: total exports
blue-collar (ηb) 0.117
∗ 0.089† 0.107∗ 0.078†
self-employed (θs) −0.277† −0.331† −0.292† −0.357†
white-collar (θw) −0.031 −0.018 −0.011 −0.010
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.102 −0.057 −0.092 −0.045
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.312 −0.360 −0.339 −0.426
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.249∗ 0.249∗ 0.236∗ 0.231∗
(0.233) (0.263) (0.240) (0.254)
Dep. Variable: (1) non-industrial products
blue-collar (ηb) −0.046 −0.018 0.037 0.001
self-employed (θs) −2.149∗∗ −2.058∗∗ −1.916∗∗ −2.014∗∗
white-collar (θw) 0.384 0.372
∗ 0.371† 0.328†
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) 0.011 0.056 −0.011 0.028
EU×self-employed (θeus) 1.771† 1.712† 2.002∗ 1.969∗
EU×white-collar (θeuw) −0.171 −0.201 −0.219 −0.175
Dep. Variable: (2) industrial products
blue-collar (ηb) 0.128
∗ 0.103∗ 0.113∗ 0.088†
self-employed (θs) −0.321† −0.363† −0.343∗ −0.400†
white-collar (θw) −0.031 −0.023 −0.001 0.017
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.067 −0.026 −0.053 −0.010
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.365 −0.414 −0.378 −0.458
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.251∗ 0.259∗ 0.233∗ 0.232∗
(0.281) (0.313) (0.292) (0.327)
Dep. Variable: (21) raw materials
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.5 continued
Variable (coef) E E lag G G lag
blue-collar (ηb) −0.051 −0.010 −0.039 −0.049
self-employed (θs) −0.140 −0.224 −0.160 −0.321
white-collar (θw) 0.011 −0.019 −0.044 0.094
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) 0.351∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.444∗∗ 0.429∗∗
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.026 −0.110 −0.038 0.206
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.398† 0.284 0.375† 0.201
Dep. Variable: (22) semi-finished products
blue-collar (ηb) 0.054 0.019 0.026 −0.007
self-employed (θs) −0.261 −0.289 −0.303 −0.352
white-collar (θw) −0.116 −0.182 −0.055 −0.111
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.014 −0.034 0.010 −0.012
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.249 −0.171 −0.166 −0.096
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.306∗ 0.330∗ 0.269† 0.280†
(0.230) (0.133) (0.250) (0.150)
Dep. Variable: (23) finished products
blue-collar (ηb) 0.134
∗ 0.108∗ 0.120∗ 0.093†
self-employed (θs) −0.341∗ −0.383† −0.361∗ −0.419†
white-collar (θw) −0.018 −0.011 0.010 0.027
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.064 −0.019 −0.050 −0.004
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.377 −0.436 −0.394 −0.487
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.244∗ 0.254∗ 0.226∗ 0.228∗
(0.296) (0.332) (0.306) (0.344)
Dep. Variable: (231) finished input products
blue-collar (ηb) 0.151
∗ 0.148∗ 0.136∗ 0.132∗
self-employed (θs) −0.114 −0.223 −0.136 −0.262
white-collar (θw) −0.162 −0.065 −0.131 −0.021
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.036 −0.020 −0.024 −0.005
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.450† −0.412 −0.397 −0.388
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.306∗ 0.224† 0.287∗ 0.194
(0.259) (0.287) (0.268) (0.300)
Dep. Variable: (232) end products
blue-collar (ηb) 0.141
∗ 0.115∗ 0.127∗ 0.100†
self-employed (θs) −0.381∗ −0.411† −0.402∗ −0.448†
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.5 continued
Variable (coef) E E lag G G lag
white-collar (θw) 0.018 0.010 0.047 0.049
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.082 −0.039 −0.068 −0.023
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.379 −0.458 −0.401 −0.516
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.228∗ 0.253∗ 0.210† 0.227∗
(0.305) (0.339) (0.316) (0.353)
Dep. Variable: (22+231) process goods (semi- and inputs)
blue-collar (ηb) 0.118
∗ 0.096† 0.100† 0.077
self-employed (θs) −0.132 −0.228 −0.159 −0.274
white-collar (θw) −0.155 −0.100 −0.117 −0.049
EU×blue-collar (ηeub) −0.002 0.011 0.013 0.027
EU×self-employed (θeus) −0.394 −0.342 −0.324 0.296
EU×white-collar (θeuw) 0.316∗∗ 0.260∗ 0.293∗ 0.224†
(0.277) (0.267) (0.289) (0.279)
N 257
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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3.3.4 Confounding factors
This section presents the results on the “confounding factor” hypothesis,
that the strong correlation between the stock of blue-collar immigrant work-
ers and the Bundesland/home country trade flow can be explained by third
factors, such as the general level of knowledge about Germany in the home
countries of the immigrants, as well as the general knowledge about the
immigrants’ home countries in the host Bundesla¨nder.
This knowledge is impossible to measure in reality, so I proxy for it by
the amount of German consulates that exist in the home countries of the
immigrants. In the case of German diplomatic missions abroad, we need
to assume that their set-up is not a result of the immigration from those
countries into Germany. This assumption is not likely to be true when
considering foreign countries’ representation in individual Bundesla¨nder:
Using the number of consulates from the immigrants’ home countries
in given Bundesla¨nder is thus more problematic, since they likely reflect
the needs of the immigrant communities and as such are likely to have
arisen after the immigrants settled in those Bundesla¨nder. In this case,
they would not reflect the knowledge stocks that would obtain in absence of
any immigration.19
Regressions F and F lag in Table 3.4 show the results of equation (3.1)
with the addition of the consulate variables (in Zij) as the proxies for the
generic information about Germany in its trading partners. The consulate
variables in the regressions of this section are: the number of German con-
sulates in the trade partner countries, and an interaction of this variable
with the EU dummy. Regressions G and G lag in Table 3.5 come from the
equation (3.3) with the consulate variables in Zij. These results must be
compared to regressions D, D lag, E and E lag in the same tables.
The qualitative implications of the results are the same as before: more
complex goods attract a stronger immigrant effect, and EU white-collar
workers are the only group with a strong and significant above-average effect.
Quantitatively, when the consulate variable is introduced in the case
19It has to be noted that the number of German consulates abroad is not likely to have
changed in the three-year period of study, and as such it acts as constants for the countries
in question. Furthermore, as these consulates are representing Germany as a whole, their
effects are not Bundesland-specific. Nevertheless, to keep the analysis comparable with
the other sections, I keep the Bundesland–home country level of disaggregation and the
1997–1998 period.
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of contemporaneous migration and trade, the EU white-collar elasticity in-
creases from 0.233 to 0.240 for total exports between regressions E and G,
and also increases for those individual good types, for which it is significant
(the information-intensive goods). When comparing regressions E lag and
G lag, the EU white-collar effect decreases for total exports (from 0.263 to
0.254), but again increases for those types of goods, for which it is significant.
Overall, both lagged and contemporaneous regressions show that the
base coefficient declines by around 10% for all product types. The decline
is consistent with our hypothesis of unobservable information influencing
both trade and migration. The robustness of this change to using lagged
migration variable might indicate that the unobservable information is stable
over time, but due to the short time series, this conclusion is tentative.
The puzzling size of the EU blue-collar effect on industrial raw materials
remain.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have introduced four innovations to help clarify the effect of
immigrants on exports from their host countries to their home countries: I
have used lagged immigration stock, distinguished the groups of immigrants
according to their host-country labour market involvement, utilised very
fine categories of the export goods types, and proposed a novel proxy for
the potential unobserved information. Several broad conclusions for policy
implications can be reached from the presented analysis.
First, the evidence for the EU migration and trade is consistent with
the information-transmission and contract-enforcement hypotheses of the
immigration–trade link. I have proposed that the weak non-EU white-collar
trade effect is not inconsistent with these hypotheses, since many non-EU
migrants are refugees,20 who have left their home countries under duress,
and as such cannot be expected to set-up a trading link with their home
country.
Second, immigrants are indeed different when it comes to their potential
effect on trade, and treating them as one aggregated group distorts their in-
dividual effects. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that an increase of 10 percent in
the number of EU white-collar immigrant to Germany will increase exports
20E.g., ex-Yugoslavian immigrants in the early nineties.
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by between 2.94 and 3.01 percent,21 while the same percentage increase in
the group of EU blue-collar immigrants will increase German exports by
between 1.27 and 1.08 percent, and the same increase in the number of all
immigrants will produce a 1.47 or 1.30 percent increase in exports.
Third finding is that more complex goods are affected more by immigrant
presence, and especially by the (EU) white-collar workers. This is most
visible in the exports of goods that act as inputs into the production of other
goods. This shows an importance of EU white-collar workers to international
supply chains (see Table 3.5).
Fourth, the self-employed immigrants as a group have similar or lower
influence on exports than blue-collar workers, most likely because large pro-
portion of self-employed immigrants work in non-exporting service indus-
tries.22 Together with the strong (EU) white-collar effect, this indicates
that migrants do not individually set up exporting businesses, but influence
exports through large companies.
Fifth, the elasticities found in the literature are likely to be biased upward
because of reverse causality of trade on migration. This can be easily fixed
by taking lags of immigration variable as an instrument for itself, which
leads to lowering of coefficients by 12 to 16 percent. The qualitative results
remain the same.
Finally, the estimates in the literature might also be biased upwards due
to another example of endogenity: unobservable factors, which can be cor-
related with both migration and trade. Taking lagged immigration variable
is one way to fix this problem. Trying to proxy for the missing factor is
another.
I hypothesise that this missing factor is the stock of knowledge that
exists in other countries about Germany, and that it can be proxied by
the number of German consular missions abroad. This does not change
qualitative results, but decreases the coefficients.
Overall, it is clear that a unifying framework for discussing the influence
of immigrants on trade does not suffice. Immigrants are different, and care
should be taken when discussing the channels through which migration may
212.94 = 2.03− 0.89 − 0.76 + 2.56.
22The insignificant coefficients of the self-employed groups are understood as having
no deviation from the base coefficient. Interpreted in this way, “no significance” is also
a result, albeit against one of the original beliefs that self-employed immigrants should
influence trade.
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affect trade. This paper has clarified which channels are important, and how
they work.
Chapter 4
The effect of Free Trade
Agreements on third
countries in markets with
differentiated goods
4.1 Motivation
Let us think of a world with international trade restricted by tariffs. What
are the implications when a subset of countries signs a free trade agreement
(FTA)? In particular, what happens to the welfare of the rest of the world?
The standard answer to this question is explained through the “innocent
bystander problem” [Krugman, 1991]: the countries left out of an FTA suffer
in welfare. The reduction in welfare is primarily due to trade diversion:
joining countries trade more with each other because of lower after-tariff
prices, even though there is a potentially more efficient producer in the rest
of the world. Some literature on the innocent bystander problem is reviewed
in the next section.
In contrast, we show that under some conditions, an FTA between a sub-
set of countries can also benefit the non-participating countries. To present
this result, we employ a model of international trade with horizontally dif-
ferentiated products. For different parameters within the same model, we
also re-establish the “innocent bystander” result. Thus, we can highlight
the conditions under which the traditional result holds or breaks down.
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The intuition behind our results is simple. The FTA between two coun-
tries reduces trade barriers and thus increases competition between their
firms. This competition leads to a global reduction in prices. Surplus then
is redistributed from firms to consumers, which is a standard result. In ad-
dition, however, increased competition also leads to a more equal pricing
pattern across countries, which reduces the average disutility cost borne by
consumers for consuming a product mix not in line with their (non-price)
preferences. This is a pure global welfare creation. For a third, non-FTA
country, the reduction of its firms’ profits due to increased competition re-
establishes the trade diversion effect in the literature. However, if that
country’s consumer population is large, the country’s consumer surplus ad-
dition will be larger than its firms’ losses and thus it will benefit from the
FTA.
A key feature of our model is the non-existence of perfect price-dis-
crimination across countries. Each of our firms has a home country but
sells its goods globally. Price-discrimination is constrained in our model by
potential cross-border arbitrage of consumers. When a firm raises or lowers
its prices in one country, its prices in another country will then change
equally. Our findings do not necessarily require that prices of a firm are
equal everywhere, but we will assume this for simplicity reasons, without
loss of generality. That price movements between countries are correlated
and there is no perfect price discrimination is supported by several findings
[see, e.g., Knetter, 1993].
In the next section, we review the relevant literature and highlight our
differences and similarities. In Section 4.3, we introduce a two-country model
to familiarise the reader with the workings of the model, before we move on
to the welfare analysis in a multi-country case. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Literature
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The first strand of literature
involves the “innocent bystander problem” [Krugman, 1991], which, as the
name suggests, discusses adverse effects for third countries left out of an
FTA between other countries. To the best of our knowledge, authors in this
literature concur with this assessment. In contrast, we highlight conditions
under which the innocent bystander is happy to be an innocent bystander.
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Of course, it has to be noted that global barrier-free trade is welfare-
maximising in our model. However, the third country will not object to
an FTA between others, because it is a welfare improvement on the case of
all-around protection, even for that third non-participating country.
The examples of an “innocent bystander problem” in literature are abun-
dant: Kose and Riezman [1997, 1999] compute a general equilibrium model
with asymmetric countries and examine two cases: Case 1, when a small
country is left out of the FTA made up of two large countries, and Case
2, when one large country is left out of the FTA made up of the remaining
large and small countries [Kose and Riezman, 1999]. They find, among other
results, that in Case 1, the small innocent bystander suffers a lot, and in
proportion to its relative smallness. Also in Case 2, the third large country
loses from the FTA because of a deterioration in its terms of trade.
Bond et al. [2004] show how the third country can win from the creation
of an FTA between two other countries, through the strategic incentives
of the FTA members to change their outside tariff policy after the cre-
ation of the FTA [cited in Andriamananjara, 2004]. When such effects are
not present, the third country typically loses; in contrast, we find condi-
tions where the third country (and the world, in total) benefits without any
strategic re-adjustment of tariffs by any country.
Andriamananjara [2004] shows that the countries left out of the FTA
have an incentive to retaliate with their own trading bloc or with increased
protection.
Winters and Chang [2000] and Chang and Winters [2002] discuss what
happens to the non-members’ firms when several countries enter into an FTA
and drop the tariffs against members. The non-member countries’ exporters
to the member countries face the competition from the member countries’
firms. Thus, as the member tariffs go down, the member countries’ firms
become more competitive, which puts pressure onto the non-member firms
to lower their prices. Like in the present paper, this is an effect on the prices
of imports that results purely from competition: Winters and Chang [2000]
show this empirically for the case of Spain and EC, and, respectively, Chang
and Winters [2002] for the case of MERCOSUR.
Ornelas [2007] provides a partial equilibrium model with differentiated
goods, with redistributional effects of an FTA: that is, the FTA redistributes
the welfare from third countries to the member countries, even if the coun-
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tries are small compared to the rest of the world (but large enough to in-
fluence their own import prices). In our model, too, member countries can
appropriate a part of non-member welfare, but this is not the only effect.
The second strand of literature introduces Hotelling line into the interna-
tional trade framework, either as a spatial economy with countries occupying
different segments of the Hotelling line, or as differentiated markets in dif-
ferent countries, connected via trade [think of two parallel Hotelling lines as
two countries, see Schmitt, 1990, 1993, 1995], and asks a question of optimal
trade policy.
When a spatial economy is involved, it is found that under some con-
ditions the optimal tariff rate is strictly positive: if the companies are able
to relocate, a tariff may induce a company to locate away from the bor-
der, thus leading to lower average transportation costs inside a country, and
hence lower delivered prices to the consumers [Herander, 1997, Porter, 1984].
In our framework, free trade is always optimal for the world as a whole. A
FTA between a subset of countries is welfare-improving compared to fully
restricted trade, but the distribution of the generated surplus between mem-
ber and non-member countries depends especially on their respective size.
Finally, Benson and Hartigan [1983] propose a model set-up which is
similar to ours, except with two countries. They show redistributional ef-
fects of a tariff for consumers. They also show a possibility of a protected
firm lowering its prices under some assumptions on competition, such as
firms anticipating that their price changes will be completely matched by a
competitor and thus that their market shares will remain intact. We dif-
fer in the number and the behaviour of the firms, and in our model, tariffs
unambiguously increase the price of the protected firm.
4.3 The model
To study the effect of an FTA on the welfare of the non-member countries, we
propose a partial equilibrium three-country model of trade in differentiated
goods, in the Hotelling style. Two countries will form an FTA, and we will
focus on the welfare of the non-FTA country. No effects are lost with the
restriction to only three countries.
Our model can represent a world of connected spatial “line” economies,
where the ends of the line stand for address-of-sale of otherwise identical
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goods, and consumers live along these lines at different distances from the
points-of-sale. Thus, each line represents the area between the economic
centres of two of the three countries, with the border somewhere on that
line.
On the other hand, the model also conforms with a “tastes” interpre-
tation, in which the ends of the line represent (national) characteristics of
the goods, and consumers are distinguished by how much they prefer one
country’s good over another’s, at given prices. As in the spatial interpreta-
tion, there is a border between each pair of countries, which mainly serves to
distinguish countries by their size. We prefer this second, “tastes” approach.
We consider a partial equilibrium analysis of one industry, similar to
Ornelas [2007].1 Our industry is small in the sense that the prices in this
industry do not affect prices (and thus marginal decisions) in any other
industry or market (including factor markets).
Within this industry, firms compete globally in differentiated products.
For our results, it suffices that the firms’ price setting in various countries
is inter-dependent: i.e., when a firm lowers its price in one country, its price
in another country must also decrease, and vice versa. In our model, firms
will set the same price in all countries. This setup was chosen for simplicity
of the model exposition and with no loss of generality.
To motivate this setting, we take as examples two large markets: the au-
tomotive and the textile market. Ginsburgh [1994] provides a good overview
of barriers-to-trade that existed in the EC/EU automotive market for decades
and even as late as 1997.2 By virtue of exemption from complying with Ar-
ticle 85 of the Common Market Treaty, as well as purely illegal activities,
the European automotive industry has set up many and varying barriers to
cross-border trade in cars even within EC/EU. The mentioned illegal ac-
tivities landed many car manufacturers in front of European and regional
courts during the 1980’s and 1990’s, but this is just one indication that the
automotive industry was far from competitive [Ginsburgh, 1994].
1The model can be closed by an introduction of a competitively produced and traded
numeraire good, which serves to balance the trade and fix labour income, but this is not
our focus. None of our main results would change. In particular, the results of creation
of consumer surplus though a more symmetric consumption of the differentiated good
in an asymmetric-country world would still hold. The partial equilibrium nature of our
model lets us concentrate on the imperfect competition in our chosen industry, and the
associated effects.
21997 corresponds to the year of the last revision of the cited paper
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While the barriers-to-trade within the European automotive industry
were not tariffs, they nevertheless ensured price discrimination and would
fall within our model as most applied at the border. However, even given
widespread cross-border price discrimination, the pricemovements over time
were still correlated. Table B.1 at the end of the paper shows cross-market
price correlations for selected car models across several geographic markets
during 1970–1999. Within continental Europe, the price correlations are
above 90 percent. The correlations between the continental and the UK
markets are never below 77 percent, and often above 90. The low UK-
related correlation might be explained by differences in driver’s wheel po-
sition. Nevertheless, the cross-country price correlation assumption seems
validated.
The textile market is subject to tariff negotiations in and with Europe,
due to perceived threat of cheap Chinese and Indian textile products. This
market would be prime for price discrimination. However, textiles are often
traded at several textile expositions, where the buyers come from all over
the world to buy centrally, at one price. An example is the Texworld Fabrics
fair in Paris, organised by Messe Frankfurt.
Governments set tariffs at the border.3 We assume that tariffs apply
equally in both directions: with countries asymmetric in size, this assump-
tion is not binding, for trade only happens in one direction in our industry.
We concentrate on the case of asymmetric countries, as it provides the most
interesting insights; our model is Ricardian in nature, such that symmetric
countries do not trade—the discussion of this case is relegated to the Ap-
pendix B.1. Firms pay the tariffs when exporting into a foreign country.
Furthermore for the firms, we assume zero marginal cost of production. As
we model market power within our industry, we assume one firm in each
country.
Next, we present the details of the model and establish results in a setting
with two asymmetric countries to familiarise the reader with the workings
of the model, before analysing the welfare implications of tariff movements
in a three-country setting in Section 4.3.2.
We attempt to explicitly state and discuss every critical assumption as
we go on.
3Tariffs are either paid by firms or consumers on a purchase: these settings are equiv-
alent, in our model.
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4.3.1 Two asymmetric countries
In the case of two countries, our model is a version of a Hotelling [1929]
model. There are two products, i and j, sold in the global market, which is
represented by a line of length s normalized to unity. The ends of this line
constitute the point of sale of these two products. Consumers are distributed
along this line from 0 to 1 with constant density f(x) = 1 and thus have a
total mass of one (so the CDF F (1) = 1). Somewhere on the line is a border
B, such that the segment [0, B) represents consumers of one country, and
the segment (B, 1] the consumers of the other country.
The location x of a consumer on the line depicts that consumer’s (non-
price) preferences over the products. The further away x is from the point
of sale at 0 or 1, the lower the utility of consuming the respective product.
This can be interpreted either geographically such that consumers incur
travel costs when purchasing at 0 or 1, or as tastes where distance relates
to disutility because product characteristics do not fully match the prefer-
ences. As an example for the tastes interpretation, take the car market in
Germany and France: the point of sale in France would then correspond to
“Frenchness” and the consumers would be distinguished by how much they
care about a French car relative to a German one, all else equal.4
Consumers are utility maximisers and buy one or zero units of a good of
at most one of the countries present. Consumers closer to the border have
a stronger preference for buying a foreign product, at given prices, than
their fellow citizens from the “centre” of the country. Consumers at 1/2 are
indifferent between buying domestic or foreign good, at equal prices. An
example of the model is depicted in Fig.4.1.
A consumer located at x with 0 ≤ x ≤ B has an additive separable
utility from consuming his domestic good i or the foreign good j such that:
ux(pi) = a− pi − r · |x− 0| , (4.1)
ux(pj) = a− pj − t− r · |1− x| , (4.2)
The parameter a is the maximal utility from consumption, pi and pj
are company i’s and respectively j’s prices, t is the tariff that the consumer
4The taste dispersion can also correspond to geography. Casual observation shows
that Saarland has many more French cars than Bavaria. Indeed, the official police cars in
Saarland are Peugeot, while in Bavaria they are BMW or Audi.
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(a) Free trade, two countries
M
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(b) Trade with tariff
Figure 4.1: Free trade and tariff with two asymmetric countries
has to pay when purchasing the foreign product and r is the transportation
costs or reduction in utility because the consumed product is away from the
individual preferences.5
The above utility function refers to a consumer x living in country i,
i.e. with 0 ≤ x ≤ B. The utility for a consumer x in country j, i.e., with
B ≤ x ≤ 1, is symmetric in the sense that a consumption from i costs
an additional t while consuming the domestic product j only costs pj plus
r · (1− x).
The countries presented are asymmetric only due to their relative pop-
ulation sizes. If the border between countries i and j lies closer to where
the good j is positioned, i is said to be large compared to j. Then i has
more consumers and more dispersed preferences. At equal prices, the aver-
age consumer of country i prefers good i, while the reverse holds for country
j. This is true irrespective of the size of the country.
The number of consumers and the dispersion of tastes go hand-in-hand
in this set-up. A bigger country by our definition will have the consumers
at its border farther away from its centre than the border consumers of a
small country from the small country’s centre. In the tastes interpretation,
this means that the preferences in the large country are more dispersed,
compared to the small country. There is weak evidence that large countries
5Assuming another well-used form of the transportation cost function—the quadratic
transportation costs—will make distance even more important and should strengthen the
results presented in this paper.
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are in fact more diverse [see Rose, 2006]. It would be possible to disentangle
the number of consumers and their dispersion with no gain of insight but at
a cost of losing simplicity.
We also assume that at zero prices and a tariff t = 0, every consumer
would have a positive utility from buying one of the products.6 That is, we
restrict our exogenous parameters to those values that lead to an effective
equilibrium between both countries at t = 0. This in particular requires
a − 32r · 1 ≥ 0, or: a ≥ 32r. This is the same as saying that the market is
covered.7
In each country, there is one profit-maximising firm. Thus there will be
one firm i and one firm j, selling their products at 0 and 1 respectively. Firms
have zero marginal cost and set prices to maximise profit. If the market is
covered, the quantities demanded at a given price are then determined by
the distance to the consumer xˆ who is indifferent between their and their
rival’s products. The indifferent consumer can be found at the intersection
of the consumer utility curves in Fig.4.1, which due to the tariff include
discontinuities at the border. The firms’ profit functions are then as follows:
pii = xˆ(pi, pj) · pi
pij = (1− xˆ(pi, pj)) · pj. (4.3)
We now solve this simple model with two countries for the equilibria
with and without tariffs. We set the border at 12 < B < 1, such that i is a
large and j a small country.
Without a tariff and with equal prices, consumers in country i with
1
2 < x ≤ B will purchase the foreign product from country j. The consumer
in country i who is indifferent between the domestic and the foreign good
is at xˆ = 12 , such that there are imports of size M = B − xˆ from country j
into country i.8 This is depicted in Fig.4.1(a).
Let us now introduce a tariff t—as in Fig.4.1(b):
Lemma 4.1 Assume the market is covered (a ≥ 32r). If the countries are
sufficiently asymmetric and the tariff t is sufficiently low, there exists an
equilibrium with imports from the small into the large country.
6The utility from consuming a hypothetical outside good is normalized to 0.
7For a detailed discussion of what happens if the market is not covered, and the re-
sulting equilibria, please refer to Ivanov and Mu¨ller [2006].
8Prices will be symmetric at pi = pj = r. This is the standard Hotelling result.
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Proof Assume that there are imports from j into i even under the tariff
such that the indifferent consumer lies at xˆ < B. We then solve for the
equilibrium prices:
pii = xˆ · pi = ( 1
2r
(pj − pi + t) + 1
2
) · pi
pij = (1− xˆ) · pj = ( 1
2r
(pi − pj − t) + 1
2
) · pj
⇒


p∗i = r +
1
3t
p∗j = r − 13t
xˆ = 12 +
1
6 · tr
(4.4)
The prices p∗i and p
∗
j constitute an equilibrium under the following con-
ditions. The indifferent consumer must lie in country i and the indifferent
consumer must derive positive utility from consuming either product:
xˆ < B ⇔ t < r · (6B − 3). (4.5)
Ux=xˆ(pj − t) = a− pj − t− r(1− xˆ) > 0⇔ t < 2a− 3r. (4.6)
Given B > 12 and a >
3
2r, there is always a positive t that fullfills both
conditions 4.5 and 4.6.
A word on the direction of trade is in order. Our firms are completely
identical. This means that having to satisfy a small domestic consumer
base is actually a comparative advantage in the sense that it pushes a firm
to export. A bigger-market firm would be content with its own domestic
consumers and would not want to export. In absence of domestic economies
of scale, the small country–to–large country trade is the natural (partial)
equilibrium outcome.
It would be possible to introduce domestic economies of scale, which
would benefit a company in a larger country, such that it then behaves
“bigger” on the global scale, exporting to smaller countries. This would cor-
respond to different types of markets and mask the main drivers behind our
results, but should not remove them. In either case, considering economies
of scale should be an interesting extension to our model, but for the time
being, we abstract from this consideration.
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In what follows, we will focus on equilibria that always exhibit trade
under a specified tariff, which also implies trade without a tariff. That is,
we look at a world with asymmetric countries, a > 32r and low enough
tariffs. The motivation is simple. If we compared a no-trade equilibrium
under a tariff with a trade equilibrium under a FTA, the FTA effects would
be stronger. Instead, we want to compare “apples” to “apples”.
Next, we discuss the welfare implications of the tariff. Welfare of each
country is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS, producer profits
pi and, where applicable, a tariff revenue. In the situation of countries i and
j as discussed in lemma 4.1, this implies
Wi = CSi(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ) + pii(p
∗
i , p
∗
j) + t ·
(
B − xˆ(p∗i , p∗j)
)
Wj = CSj(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ) + pij(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ). (4.7)
Note that the tariff proceeds enter the welfare of countries but are re-
distributed to neither consumers nor firms. We can immediately derive the
following:
Lemma 4.2 Assume the market is covered (a ≥ 32r). With a tariff and
asymmetric countries, equilibrium prices will be unequal. Equal prices and,
thus, highest welfare can be achieved only under free trade: starting with a
tariff equilibrium, welfare strictly increases the closer the countries get to
the free trade situation.
Lemma 4.2 is a standard result in a Hotellin-style models. On the other
hand, it is central to our model. Therefore, instead of a proof, we provide a
detailed discussion of the Lemma:
Let us look at the case of two asymmetric countries: the intuition is the
same with more than two countries.
First, lemma 4.1 shows that with a tariff and asymmetric countries,
equilibrium prices will be unequal. Let us now motivate why overall welfare
is maximized with equal pricing and no tariff.
To understand the welfare effects of a tariff, it suffices to compare two
cases as depicted in Fig.4.2: Equal prices without a tariff and the introduc-
tion of a tariff t, holding prices fixed. The second case does not constitute
an equilibrium, as argued in lemma 4.1. Instead, prices will be unequal in
equilibrium. We ignore this aspect in Fig.4.2 for the purpose of simplicity
but will get back to it later on.
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In Fig.4.2, the consumer surplus given producer prices pi = pj is the total
area under the consumer utility curves, U(pi) and U(pj). The producer
surplus is given by the dotted rectangle at the top between a, U(pi) and
U(pj), and including the area (A). The parts of these areas to the left of the
border B belong to country i, and to the right of B, to country j.
M
Mˆ
1/2i Bxˆ
j
a
U(pj + t)
U(pj)U(pi)
A
TRC
Figure 4.2: Welfare change from a price increase by firm j
Now, imagine for a moment that a tariff t is introduced and prices pi = pj
stay constant. Then, the effective price that consumers in country i pay for
products imported from j increases to pj + t. Thus, imports into i decrease
from M to Mˆ (the indifferent consumer moves from 12 to xˆ).
The welfare changes in the following way: Country i now has a tariff
revenue (TR) (light grey parallelogram) on the remaining imports from j.
This tariff revenue is paid by those consumers in i that remain purchasing
product j. Thus, (TR) is a pure redistribution of welfare from consumers to
the government in country i. In addition, firm i appropriates surplus from
firm j because of decreased imports, depicted by the grey rectangle (A). All
the other surpluses belong to the same actors also after introducing t, except
for the white triangle (C).
This triangle (C) is a pure dead-weight loss, as consumers lying between
1/2 and xˆ now purchase their less preferred good (from firm i) over their
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more preferred one (from firm j). In fact, such a dead-weight loss will always
occur once the indifferent consumer xˆ lies away from 12 . The dead-weight
loss (C) could only be avoided when the effective price of firm j in country
i was equal to the price of firm i, i.e., pj + t = pi. As lemma 4.1 shows, this
does not constitute an equilibrium because p∗j + t = r +
2
3 t 6= r + 13t = p∗i ,
∀t > 0. Thus, under a tariff, the indifferent consumer will lie to the right
of 12 as xˆ =
1
2 +
1
6 · tr > 12 . The welfare maximizing equilibrium can result
only from free trade, when prices are equal: with tariff t > 0, an asymmetric
equilibrium necessarily obtains.
Note that in Fig.4.2, we compared equal prices without a tariff and the
introduction of a tariff t, holding prices fixed. From lemma 4.1 instead we
know that under the tariff, firms will adjust their prices compared to the
pre-tariff situation. Thus the effect of the tariff is compensated by pricing
to some degree, but not completely. As lemma 4.1 shows, imports will still
decrease relative to the non-tariff situation and the basic intuition of Fig.4.2
holds.
Under a free trade agreement between these two countries, prices are
pi = pj = r and therefore, the overall world welfare is maximised and equal
to
W a = a− 1
4
r.
On the other hand, with a tariff t, the (asymmetric price) equilibrium of
lemma 4.1 results in the overall welfare of
W t = a− 1
4
r − 1
36
t2
r
< W a,
where W t is strictly decreasing in t.
The effect of a tariff on the welfare of the importing country is deter-
mined by the dead-weight loss in its consumer surplus versus the increased
domestic firm’s profit due to the appropriation of surplus from the foreign
firm. Depending on the size of these changes, country i can gain or lose
overall. For the exporting country, we know that welfare will be lower under
the tariff as the price of its products as well as the size of exports decrease.
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4.3.2 Three asymmetric countries
Let us expand the analysis to three countries i, j, as well as k, and assume
that consumers of these countries are arranged along the sides of a triangle
as depicted in Fig.4.3. The corners of the triangle represent the points of
sale9 of (domestic) products, just as in the case of two countries. Each side
of the triangle is assumed to have length and consumer mass of one. There
is one large country i and two identical small countries j and k. The borders
are then 12 < Bij = Bik < 1 and Bjk =
1
2 .
10
To understand the welfare analysis for individual countries in the sub-
sequent sections, it is important to keep in mind that any move to a more
equal pricing pattern, moving the indifferent consumer closer to 12 , increases
welfare.
We start with the restricted trade situation between all pairs of countries,
where symmetric tariffs tij = tik = tjk = t apply at every border.
j
Bij
Bjk
Bik
i
k
Figure 4.3: One large and two small countries
9Or (national) characteristics
10We now define without loss of generality that in the market between countries i and
j, i is the origin and the position of j is at 1. In the market between countries j and k, j
is the origin and the position of k is at 1.
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Theorem 4.1 Let there be two small and one large country with symmetric
tariffs; let the market be covered (a ≥ 32r). Then, as long as tariffs t are
low enough, there are two possible equilibria with imports M into the large
country from the two small countries. With a low valuation a of the good
by consumers, a ∈ (32r, 72r), a “high” price equilibrium is obtained where
firms in the small countries behave like a two-product monopolist. For a
high valuation a > 15+4
√
2
10 r, there is a “low” price equilibrium.
Proof Because j and k are symmetric and the border between them is set
to Bjk =
1
2 , the price level in both countries will be the same and there will
thus be no trade across the border Bjk.
One possible equilibrium includes the price pcj = p
c
k = a − 12r (see
Fig.4.4(a)). Under these prices, all consumers in countries j and k con-
sume and the consumer at the border Bjk receives zero utility (i.e., he is
just indifferent between buying any of the two closest goods or not buying
at all). This price would also obtain if there were no tariff but the firms j
and k colluded—we call this “high” price equilibrium. We get the following
outcome:
phj = p
h
k = a− 12r
phi =
1
2a+
1
4r +
1
2t
⇒Mh = 2 · (B − 18 − 14 tr − 14 ar )
⇒W hi = 2 ·
(
1
8 +
1
4
t
r
+ 14
a
r
) (
7
8a− 116r − 18t
)
+2 · (B − 18 − 14 tr − 14 ar ) (12Br + 18a− 716r + 18t) , (4.8)
where W hi is the welfare of country i, and M
h are the imports into i from
country j and k. Note that because j and k are symmetric, we express Mh
only as dependent on B = Bij = Bik.
This equilibrium needs to be stable against deviating strategies by a
single player. This requires specific conditions on a, r, and t. The details
can be found in the Appendix B.2.1, but for our discussion it suffices to note
that, in particular, t needs to be sufficiently small and a can not be too high.
It can be shown that
∀ (a,B) : a ∈
(
3
2
r,
7
2
r
)
& B ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, (4.9)
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there exists a sufficiently low t such that the collusive equilibrium is obtained.
Another possible equilibrium is when companies j and k charge lower-
than-collusive prices due to competition with i in the foreign market. This
equilibrium is labeled “low” and exhibits the following properties:
plj = p
l
k =
5
3r − 13 t
pli =
4
3r +
1
3t
⇒ M l = 2 · (B − 23 − 16 tr)
⇒ W li = 2 ·
(
2
3 +
1
6
t
r
) (
a− 13r − 112 t
)
+2 · (B − 23 − 16 tr) (a− 73r + 512t+ 12Br) . (4.10)
Again, for the existence of this equilibrium, conditions on a, r, and t
must hold, and the firms’ individual rationality conditions have to rule out
profitable deviations. This requires, in particular:
a >
15 + 4
√
2
10
r & B ∈
(
2
3
, 1
)
, (4.11)
i.e., that the countries are sufficiently asymmetric in size and consumer
valuation of the good is high enough. The detailed conditions can be found
in the Appendix B.2.2.
The attractiveness of one equilibrium over the other depends on the
surplus that can be extracted from domestic consumers, determined by a,
and the export potential into i, which depends on the border B = Bij = Bik.
If a is large, the FTA countries’ firms may forgo export revenue and extract
as much surplus as possible from their domestic consumers. Otherwise,
the export revenue is more attractive than the domestic revenue. When
comparing the two equilibria, it has to be kept in mind that we only analyze
situations with trade. For a particularly high a, surplus extraction from
domestic customers will be more attractive than exporting. We do not
consider this case because we want to compare equilibria with trade.11 The
detailed conditions for the attractiveness of one equilibrium over the other
are relegated to the end of Appendix B.2.2.
It is possible to show that the two equilibria in Theorem 4.1 are the
only two pure-strategy equilibria possible under given conditions, using the
11Otherwise we would be comparing “apples” with “oranges”. Our results comparing
to the situation with the FTA would be stronger, but inadequate.
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arguments of the proof of Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.1.
Next, we abolish the tariff tjk between countries j and k through the
formation of an FTA, while the tariffs tij = tik = t are upheld. We show its
implications for the world welfare through the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2 Let there be two small and one large country with symmetric
tariffs; let the market be covered (a ≥ 32r). When the small countries j
and k set up an FTA, the overall world welfare increases. If the tariff t
is low enough and the third, non-participating, country is big enough, that
country’s welfare also increases.
Proof First, we obtain the post-FTA equilibrium prices and imports (de-
picted in Fig.4.4(b)):12
paj = p
a
k = r − 15t
pai = r +
2
5t
⇒ Ma = 2 · (B − 12 − 15 tr)
⇒ W ai = 2 ·
(
1
2 +
1
5
t
r
) (
a− 14r − 110t
)
+2 · (B − 12 − 15 tr) (a− 74r + 310t+ 12Br) . (4.12)
Prices set by firms j and k are clearly lower than before the FTA, due to
stronger competition with each other.13 Note that, due to the abolition of
the tariff between them, firms j and k compete more fiercely with each other,
but there will still be no trade between these countries due to their symmetry.
Because the firms cannot price discriminate internationally, competition is
carried over into country i where firm i lowers its price in its own market.
The FTA also leads to more imports from the small countries j and k into i.
Given the market is covered (a > 32r), we haveM
h < 2·(B − 12 − 14 tr) < Ma.
And for a small t, also M l < Ma.14
Under conditions (4.9) and (4.11) that ensure collusive and competitive
equilibria, respectively, also the FTA equilibrium exists. This is due to
the fact that under the FTA, there are more imports and the indifferent
consumer in i lies further away from the border than before. The details
12Identical effects apply respectively to the comparison between the FTA equilibrium
and a pre-FTA competitive equilibrium and are depicted in Fig.B.2 in the Appendix B.2.3.
13Note also that prices are below the competitive prices pj = pk = r with two countries.
14A small t is any t < 5r. As discussed in Appendix.B.2.2, the competitive equilibrium
also requires t < 2r such that the the former condition is always fulfilled.
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of the calculations of the FTA equilibrium are presented in the Appendix
B.2.3.
a
phi p
h
j = p
h
k
Mh
jBi
t
k1/2 1/2
(a) Collusive tariff (pre-FTA) equilibrium
a
pai < p
h
i p
a
j = p
a
k < p
h
j
Ma > Mh
jBi
t
t
k1/2 1/2
(b) Post-i/j-FTA equilibrium
Figure 4.4: Pre-FTA and post-FTA equilibria with one large and two small
countries
With the post-FTA equilibrium in mind, we now proceed to the welfare
discussion. We have shown that the indifferent j/k consumer stays at 12
and the i/j and i/k consumers move closer to the middle of their respective
markets: thus, as was discussed at the end of Section 4.3.1, we immedi-
ately know that the total world welfare post-FTA is higher than before the
FTA. We now show under which conditions the non-FTA country i gains,
compared to the collusive pre-FTA equilibrium:
W ai > W
h
i
⇔ − (10a−15r+2t)(30a+(75−160B)r+14t)800r > 0,
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which, together with t > 0, implies:
0 < t <
5
14
(32Br − 6a− 15r) and thus B > 1
2
+
3
16
a
r
. (4.13)
A similar condition when comparing with the competitive pre-FTA equi-
librium is then:
W ai > W
l
i
⇒ (5r−t)(5(−7+8B)r−t)150r > 0,
which with t > 0 implies:
0 < t < 40Br − 35r and thus B > 7
8
. (4.14)
The welfare effect of the FTA on country i is determined by three factors:
First, higher imports into i increase consumer welfare because the equilib-
rium moves closer to the situation with free trade. The same effect has also
been discussed in the case of two countries in Section 4.3.1. Second, higher
imports increase the tariff revenue of country i. And third, higher imports
and lower prices reduce the profits of firm i. The sum of these countervailing
effects determines the net welfare effect on country i.
The sum of the effects is positive for a large enough border B because a
large border ensures that a high number of consumers in country i benefit
from the downward movement in prices. On the other hand, the loss of firm
i does not depend on the border but on the indifferent consumer before and
after the FTA.
We have just shown how an FTA can benefit a third country, but it still
remains to check the incentive for countries j and k to conclude an FTA
agreement in the first place. Because all welfare effects of the FTA within
countries j and k are purely redistributional, we concentrate on the potential
welfare gain generated through increased exports from j and k into i. It thus
suffices to compare firm j’s (alternatively, k’s) overall revenues from exports
before and after the FTA:
Maj · paj > Mhj · phj ,
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which implies (with t > 0):
t > max
{
0,
5
8
(8Br − 2a− 3r)
}
, with
0 <
5
8
(8Br − 2a− 3r) ⇔ B > 3
8
+
1
4
a
r
, (4.15)
for the collusive pre-FTA equilibrium, and separately for the competitive
pre-FTA equilibrium:
Maj · paj > M lj · plj
⇔ 57 (12Br − 11r) < t < 5r. (4.16)
There is a range of parameters (a,B, t) with t > 0 that simultaneously
satisfy conditions (4.13) and (4.15) (or (4.14) and (4.16), with the compet-
itive pre-FTA equilibrium). In the case of (4.13) and (4.15) this holds for
any B > 1324 +
5
36
a
r
(and in the case of (4.14) and (4.16) for B > 78). For
these parameters, not only do countries j and k gain from forming an FTA
agreement with each other, but also the “innocent bystander” i gains in wel-
fare, because its consumers benefit from the global competition of j’s and
k’s firms.
4.4 Conclusion
We have presented a partial equilibrium model of international trade, in
which an exogenous reduction in the barriers-to-trade may have welfare im-
plications for third, as well as for directly affected countries. When applied
to the establishment of an FTA, by treating the barriers-to-trade as tar-
iffs, we who the following: On the one hand, under some parameters, the
non-participating country loses in welfare, a situation widely known as the
“innocent bystander problem”. On the other hand, there are situations un-
der which all countries in our model world, including the non-member, may
gain in welfare after setting up an FTA between a subset of countries.
The intuition behind our result is simple. Through the FTA, firms in
the member countries compete more fiercely with each other and lower their
prices. Competition is carried over into the third country. This moves the
equilibrium outcome closer to the free trade situation. Since the free trade
situation is welfare-maximising, this increases the world welfare.
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For the non-participating country, in a certain parameter range, the loss
in profit of its firms is outweighed by the gain in its consumer surplus plus
the tariff revenue from imports, such that even the non-participating country
can gain from an FTA between other countries.
There are potentially many historical settings in which the model can
be applied. Setting up of Benelux Customs Union in 1948 may have lead
to stronger competitive behaviour of the Benelux companies abroad. New
EU members typically have had an FTA agreement with the EU prior to
joining, but may have been forced to accept a reduction of barriers to other
new members, which in turn may have lead to stronger competition of their
companies in the old EU, even though nothing has changed on those borders.
Taking the model in the other direction, the break-up of former Yu-
goslavia and the USSR may have lead to their companies behaving in a less
competitive fashion elsewhere in the world. The break-up of these countries
can be seen as going from an FTA to a protective world, with an introduc-
tion of tariffs and other trade barriers between former trade partners, which
within a model would lead to a less aggressive behaviour (i.e., higher prices)
by the firms of the ex-member countries.
To sum up, we have attempted to highlight some factors, under which
an FTA between a subset of countries may be welfare-improving for all
countries, and thus may be viewed as a stepping-stone to the completely
free-trade world.
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Chapter 5
“Ineffective” competition: a
puzzle?
5.1 Introduction
Increased competition between firms in a differentiated market can be de-
fined as an increase in the number of firms present or, alternatively, as a
decreased horizontal differentiation between a constant number of firms in
a fixed market. Standard thinking about these two kinds of competition in
an oligopolistic market would suggest that an increase in competition may
lead to weakly lower prices in this market.
In contrast, oligopoly models with additional features like repeated in-
teractions, collusion, threats, or taste for variety, eventually produce a coun-
tervailing effect. But even these models in general display the conventional
competition effect as described above. So will, for example, more competi-
tion in equilibrium also lead to a decreased propensity of collusion and thus
lower prices.
In this contribution, we use a standard one stage model of horizontal dif-
ferentiation as introduced by Hotelling [1929] and Salop [1979] to show that
even in a simple setting, increased competition1 may in fact lead to higher
prices without explicit communication amongst the players. Although the
discovery of this effect dates back to, in particular, Salop [1979] and Econo-
mides [1989], it was not until recent research that this effect has been appre-
1Here, the two kinds of increased competition coincide in terms of optimizing behaviour
of the firms.
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ciated as reasonable strategic behaviour of the players. We independently
add our empirical evidence to the con-current works of Perloff et al. [2006]
and Chen and Riordan (2006b, 2006a).
In the next section, we briefly review the relevant literature and contrast
it with our work. We analyze the comparative statics of the model in depth
in section 5.3. Subsequently in section 5.4, we find evidence for a positive
relationship between prices and the density of firms in a market of petrol
stations in German cities.
5.2 Literature
The fact that it is possible to have increasing equilibrium prices with respect
to decreasing differentiation in a Hotelling-type model has been pointed
out before. However, it was not until recently that economists started to
investigate this effect in detail.
Salop [1979] and Economides [1989] are two works that first report the
non-monotone price behaviour that we investigate here. However, these
authors seem to have believed the effect to be strange and difficult to see in
reality.2 Their models differ from the other standard Hotelling works3 in one
critical point: Salop and Economides both introduce an outside option for
consumers to choose, such that consumers are not forced to participate in
the market. In our model—which is a direct descendant of Salop [1979]—if
all consumers were made to buy at least from one firm, the pricing behaviour
would be monotone positive with respect to the distance between the firms,
just as the standard intuition would suggest.
There exists other work that also derives seemingly counter-intuitive
results about the behaviour of the firms in horizontally differentiated mar-
ketplaces, but these papers have different settings. For example, Stahl [1982]
and Schulz and Stahl [1996] study externalities from many firms in one mar-
ketplace, which may lead single-product firms in one marketplace to charge
higher prices than a multi-product monopolist. They do not look at com-
peting marketplaces, which makes their results different to our paper.
In the last couple of years, many economists started to pay attention to
2Beckmann [1972] also reports the same behaviour, but does not discuss it.
3Most notably, d’Aspremont et al. [1979], Anderson [1986, 1988], Osborne and Pitchik
[1987]
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the possibility of “price-increasing” competition.4 The most notable work
in this field is Perloff et al. [2006] and Chen and Riordan (2006b, 2006a).
Chen and Riordan (2006b, 2006a) theoretically expose the conditions un-
der which it is possible to expect equilibrium price to go up in the number
of players in a differentiated market, amongst other things, and discuss why
this is evidenced in some real-life examples. The former model in this list
has Hotelling model as a special case, such that our results would coincide.
The latter is a more general study of conditions under which we can expect
prices to increase in the number of firms; this model approaches Hotelling
model in the limit of certain parameters. One of the effects that we high-
light is evident in Chen and Riordan [2006a], but we also discuss the “kink
equilibria” where the duopolists independently set prices at the level of a
two-product monopoly, and this is outside the parameter range discussed
in that paper. Furthermore, we provide direct empirical evidence for our
theoretical example.
Perloff et al. [2006] is perhaps closest to our work in the sense that
it demonstrates the price-increasing effect of competition within a slightly
modified Salop [1979] model, and provides empirical evidence to show this
effect. The empirical evidence comes from observing prices of the incum-
bents and entrants before and after entry of new firms into the US anti-ulcer
drug market between 1977 and 1993. While the authors are able to directly
address the comparison of duopoly and one-product monopoly situations in
the same market, they use a very long time series which may be suscepti-
ble to the latter entrants influencing their positioning in the characteristics
space.
Our research is both different and complementary to the above. While
Perloff et al. [2006] use information from the time series data of prices in a
differentiated market, we use the cross-sectional information from the spa-
tial market, which we believe is close to the spirit of Hotelling [1929] and
similar models. Furthermore, we put emphasis on (and test for) the “kink”
equilibria of the duopoly game, while the above works concentrate primarily
on the price comparison across the monopoly-duopoly scenarios.
4This is in fact the name of Chen and Riordan [2006a].
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5.3 The Model
The model we present is very similar to the model of Perloff et al. [2006].
We present here the basics, and leave some details to the Appendix C.1.
We have two goals:
(a) to investigate the pricing of a duopoly in a differentiated goods mar-
ket as a function of the degree of differentiation, where the degree of
differentiation is given by a transportation cost a` la Hotelling, and
(b) to investigate the pricing of a duopoly in a differentiated goods market
for a fixed degree of differentiation vis-a´-vis two reference cases (one-
and two-product monopoly setting) settings.
5.3.1 Set-up
Our market is a line from 0 to s with firms positioned exogenously on the
opposite sides and consumers uniformly distributed with density 1/s and a
total mass of one. This reflects short-run situation in the market where the
positioning of the firms is fixed and the firms are only able to change prices.
Each point x is that consumer’s preferred good, giving him a utility a > 0.
Consumers are utility maximizers and buy one or zero units of a good
from at most one of the companies present. This decision is summarised
in the conditions (5.2) and (5.3) below. They may prefer to buy some
homogeneous outside good, which costs 0 and delivers 0 utility to every
consumer, irrespective of location.
We assume an additive separable utility form for each person located at
x between 0 and s:
ux(pi, zi) = a− pi − t · zi, (5.1)
where z0 = x or z1 = s−x is the distance to firm 0 and firm 1, respectively,
t is the transportation cost and pi is firm i’s price.
Given firms’ prices pi, p−i ∈ [0, a], the consumer located at x buys prod-
uct i if and only if: (a) he prefers good i to good −i,
ux(pi, zi) ≥ ux(p−i, z−i) (5.2)
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and (b) he prefers good i to the outside option,
ux(pi, zi) ≥ 0. (5.3)
As the consumers do not act strategically, we can map their decisions
directly into the (piece-wise linear) demand function for the firms. The
piece-wise demand equation for firm i is then given by the distance from
that firm to the closest indifferent consumer weighted with the density of
consumers 1/s on that part of the market.5
Di(pi, p−i|a, s, t) = max
{
0︸︷︷︸
[0]
,min
{
a− pi
st︸ ︷︷ ︸
[1]
,
1
2
+
1
2st
(p−i − pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
[2]
, 1︸︷︷︸
[3]
}}
(5.4)
From the demand equation (5.4) we get the profit function by multiplying
by the price pi:
Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) = pi ·Di(pi, p−i|a, s, t). (5.5)
The profit function covers the full space of p−i ∈ [0, a] and the parameters
a,s,t ∈ R+ and is written out in Appendix C.1.2.
Function Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) from equation (5.5) is quasi-concave and con-
tinuous in pi. The positive part is strictly concave. Therefore, the func-
tion has a unique maximum above zero. In fact, given any quadruplet
(p−i, a, s, t), the maximiser lies either in the interior of one of the non-zero
piece-wise components [1] or [2] of the profit function, or in one of the cor-
ners of part [2]. One example for the demand and profit function is depicted
in figure 5.1.
5.3.2 Best responses
Maximising the profit from equation (5.5) with respect to pi, we get firm
i’s continuous best response function pi(p−i|a, s, t). For discussion, we name
the areas of the best response function. The pieces span the space for all
5An example for the demand for firm i’s product depending on its price pi is shown in
figure C.1 in Appendix C.1.2.
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pia
D(pi)
1
[3]
[2]
[1]
[0]
(a) Demand
pia
pi(pi)
1/2
[3]
[2]
[1]
[0]
(b) Profit
Figure 5.1: Demand and profit regions at fixed parameters p−i = 0.8, a = 1,
t = 0.5 and s = 1
parameters as shown in figure 5.2.
The parameters for the market size s between the firms and for the
relative transportation cost t always enter in the same way as a product for
the total transportation cost across the whole market st, such that we don’t
need to treat them separately from now on. We discuss the firms’ rationale
behind this best response function by letting st increase and thereby taking
us through the different regions of the best response function.
GM Global monopoly (pi(p−i|a, s, t) = a− st): occurs when the competing
firm has totally priced itself out of the market (p−i ≥ a) and the total
transportation cost is so low, that the firm finds it optimal to set a
price to just serve the whole market.
CM Capturing the whole market (pi(p−i|a, s, t) = p−i − st): here, the
competitor prices itself out of competition (p−i < a but still too high
such that firm i is able to capture the whole market: p−i ≥ 3st).
Together with global monopoly situation, firm i’s maximum profit is
at the kink between parts [3] and [2] of the graph in panel (b) of Figure
5.1.
EC Effective competition (pi(p−i|a, s, t) = st+p−i2 ): the best response refers
to an inner maximum over the part [2] of demand and of profit equa-
tion. Here, the market is covered, and any change in prices leads to
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st32a
4
3a
1
2a
p−i
a
GM
CM EC IC LM
Figure 5.2: Areas of the best response function pi in p−i–st space
stealing consumers from—or driving your consumers to—the competi-
tor.
IC Ineffective competition (pi(p−i|a, s, t) = 2a − st − p−i): refers to the
kink between [1] and [2] in the demand function and in the profit
function: if the firm lowers its price, it steals the customers from the
competitor; if it increases its price, some customers switch to the out-
side option—not to the competitor. This means the difference in the
price elasticities around the kink in the demand leads to the firm pric-
ing at the kink, such that the indifferent consumer is just indifferent
between buying from either firm or not buying at all. Note that the
prices in this region are strategic substitutes: ∂pi(·)/∂p−i < 0.
LM Local monopoly (pi(p−i|a, s, t) = a2 ): refers to inner maximum over
part [1] of the demand and profit function. The total transportation
cost here is high enough, such that the firm can ignore the presence of
the competitor and set prices in a local monopoly, playing against the
outside option. Consumers in the middle remain unserved.
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5.3.3 Equilibrium
Solving the system of best response functions, we find that there is a unique
pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium, with an equilibrium price p∗i for
any parameter tuple (a, s, t). We characterise our equilibrium in terms of
st’s relation to a as we are interested in the comparative statics with respect
to the level of the exogenous parameters st.
p∗ =


st if st ≤ 23a
a− st2 if 23a < st ≤ a
a
2 if st > a
(5.6)
Theorem 5.1 Over some range of product differentiation, the equilibrium
duopoly price is rising if the market becomes less differentiated.
Proof Follows directly from equation (5.6), if “product differentiation” is
taken to mean some combination of the distance between the firms (s) and
the transportation cost (t). 
The equilibrium prices in equation (5.6) lie in three different regions
of the best response function (EC, IC, and LM)—corresponding to three
different rationales for the behaviour of the firms—depending on the trans-
portation cost and the distance between the firms, st. The equilibrium price
of the duopoly case is pictured with a solid line in figure 5.3. As reference
cases, we use the pricing of the one-product monopolist (dotted line) and
of a two-product monopolist (dashed line).6 For small st, the firms engage
in effective competition and their behaviour corresponds to standard under-
standing of lower prices at lower levels of transportation cost or distance.
The limit (as st → 0) of this case is marginal cost pricing in a Bertrand
competition with a homogenous good. For very high st values, the firms
maximize profits by acting as local monopolists and setting the monopoly
price a/2.
In the middle region (st ∈ [a/2, a]), we see the price first overshoot the
one-product monopoly price and then return to the one-product monopoly
price with higher st.
6Please refer to Appendix C.2 for the computation of the reference cases.
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Figure 5.3: Equilibrium prices in the duopoly, and the 1-product and 2-
product monopoly reference cases
For st ∈ [23a, a], the equilibrium lies in the region of “ineffective” com-
petition and the duopoly firms act as a two-product monopolist without
explicit communication or coordination through repeated games. They are
led solely by profit maximization through setting prices. Notably, at all of
these st, the firms price such that the indifferent consumer is exactly indiffer-
ent between the two goods and the outside option. The firms decide not to
engage in competition, instead they evade competition by jointly exploiting
the consumers as long as all consumers participate.
The last paragraphs are summed up thus:
Theorem 5.2 Depending on the degree of product differentiation, an equi-
librium duopoly price may be strictly above a one-product monopolist price,
and may exactly equal a two-product monopoly price.
In Section 5.4, we devise a test to validate Theorem 5.1.7
5.3.4 Discussion
We argue, that this equilibrium behaviour reflects a reasonable strategy in
practice. The rigidity of the partitioning of the market and the adjustment
7We are not able to directly test Theorem 5.2. On the other hand, Perloff et al. [2006]
provide a very good treatment of an equivalent of Theorem 5.2.
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over prices is directly driven by the different price elasticities of demand
for the firms. In this equilibrium, they face a discretely higher elasticity of
demand for price increases than for price decreases because they lose more
customers to the outside option when increasing the price, than they gain
consumers from the competitor when lowering the price.
Similarly, we can assess the effects of ineffective competition in the com-
parison of the duopoly setting to the two-product monopoly setting. In the
region of st ∈ [23a, a], the firms in the duopoly set prices like a two-product
monopolist, although they could engage in competition. Here, the market
is in fact less than twice the size of the market a one-product monopolist
would deliberately decide to serve at its profit-maximising price for the same
set of parameters. However, the mere increase in the number of firms at the
positions as described in the model on this specific st-range does not de-
crease the equilibrium prices. As compared to the one-product monopolist,
we shall even see a price increase. This effect needs to be considered, when
judging on firm concentration in such markets. The effect will be prevalent
in markets that at the same time are horizontally differentiated, show lim-
ited market expansion as reaction to lower prices in the market, and have
an outside option for the consumers.8
5.4 Empirical model
In this section, we examine Theorem 5.1 (that equilibrium prices fall as the
degree of differentiation in a market increases, over some range) with the
data on the pricing behaviour of petrol stations along the station density
in different city districts in Germany.9 We believe that this petrol market
corresponds closely to the spatial competition as presented in our model,
despite some problems discussed briefly below. We take the station density,
denoted as ζ, as a proxy for the inverse of the distance between the firms
(1/s) and we assume that the per distance transportation cost t is equal in
all cities. Thus, we look at an equilibrium price in our model as a function
of the station density ζ, together with the two kinks at ζ ′ and ζ ′′ as depicted
8See Chen and Riordan [2006a] for an independent theoretical discussion of a similar
topic.
9A district is an administrative unit at the level of a county (“Landkreis” or “Kreisfreie
Stadt” in German), between a community and a state. City districts therefore contain a
large city and its closest surroundings.
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in figure 5.4. We adapt Theorem 5.1 to have the Empirical Hypothesis 5.1.
Hypothesis 5.1 The equilibrium prices in the petrol market in German city
districts increase in station density over some range of observable station
densities.
station density ζ = 1/(st)ζ ′ = 32aζ
′′ = 1
a
p∗
2
3a
1
2a
Figure 5.4: Equilibrium price prediction for station density
It is clear that effective competition (to the right of ζ ′) is abundant, and
this has in fact been shown in Karle [2005], for this particular data set. We
do not believe that local monopolies exist in the market for petrol in German
city districts, which is why we do not expect to find the part of the curve
that is to the left of ζ ′′ in figure 5.4.
What we add to the discussion is the identification of the middle section
of “ineffective competition”: we first reject the hypothesis that the prices are
a downward-sloping function of station density across all station densities,
then we find a suitable value for a kink point ζ ′, and estimate a two-part
connected linear curve around this kink.
To bridge the gap between the model of section 5.3 and our empirical
work, we need to assume that consumers and stations are in fact distributed
uniformly within the district, that consumers do frequent the closest station,
ceteris paribus, and that districts have zero interaction with each other.
Of course, these are strict assumptions. For one, consumers’ locations are
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typically not given by their physical address, but rather by their every-day
route to and from work (which furthermore may be in a different district).
On the other hand, we believe that any distortion from these problems
should enter in the same way irrespective of the observed station density.
Therefore, these distortions should at worst hinder our analysis and at best
have no effect, but they should not help us identify the upward-sloping part
of the curve around the kink ζ ′ in figure 5.4.
5.4.1 Data
We use daily German petrol station price data collected for 78 days starting
April 13, 2005, from a service website for retail petrol price comparisons.10
Some of the original sample entries had missing observations for our
variables of interest. For example, Sunday and Saturday prices were largely
not reported by the stations, so we only include weekday prices in the sample.
While there were some observations from the rural districts, only the city
districts ensure that the sample observations are representative of all the
petrol stations in a district. At the end, we are left with a consistent sub-
sample of the original data that contains daily price observations for 807
petrol stations in 93 major German city districts for 63 days.
The stations are divided into brand types: Premier-brand or A-type (e.g.,
Shell, BP), second-tier or B-type, and independent or C-type, according to
their differentiation in the eyes of consumers.
We treat the districts as markets in the sense of section 5.3. Our depen-
dent variable is the average retail price of one litre of petrol in a district,
for each day and brand type, which gives us 14, 984 observations. We need
to control for the changes in variables that may influence consumer prefer-
ences (the brand type, income) and marginal cost (local wholesale price per
litre), as these are held constant in the model of section 5.3. In fact, the
local wholesale price changed dramatically during the sample period, while
income is different across the districts. We thus consider as independent
variables: station density in a district, income per capita in a district, the
brand type and the local wholesale price.
The income is measured as local GDP per capita in a city; the local GDP
is taken from “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der La¨nder 2003”.
10For a detailed data description, see Karle [2005].
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The wholesale price is the daily price reported for the petrol spot market in
Rotterdam, by Energie-Informationsdienst; we take a 5-day moving average
of this price to capture the adjustment lag of the retail price to the wholesale
price changes. The local wholesale price is then the moving average of the
Rotterdam price adjusted for time-persistent local differences, which are
reported weekly by Europe Oil-telegram. The station density, ζ, is measured
as the average number of stations per square kilometre in a district.
5.4.2 Testing for negative relationship between prices and
station density
Suppose we know the value ζ ′ in figure 5.4. In order to test for negative
price–station density relationship, we first partition the 14, 984 observations
into two parts according to the kink station density, ζ¯ = ζ ′: with n1(ζ¯)
observations to the left of ζ¯, and n2(ζ¯) = 14, 984 − n1(ζ¯) to the right. We
then use OLS to estimate a two-part connected linear curve with a kink at
ζ¯, which gives us two slope parameters for the curves on the right and left
partitions. Last, we test the equality of these two parameters using a Chow
test, which is stated formally below.
Of course, we cannot compute ζ ′. Instead, we repeat our estimation and
test pragmatically for different assumed values of ζ¯. We start with ζ¯ = 0.25
and move down in increments of 0.005 until ζ¯ = 0.09.
To estimate the two curves with the constraint that they meet at ζ¯, we
transform the station density to be around 0 with:
adjusted station density = station density− ζ¯, (5.7)
which permits us an estimation of one intercept for both parts of the curve
in a single OLS regression. Now we can fit the two-part connected linear
model, which allows for different parameters in different partitions:
[
p1
p2
]
=
[
i X1 0 Z1 0
i 0 X2 0 Z2
]
·


α
β
γ
δ1
δ2

+
[
1
2
]
, (5.8)
where p1 and p2 are the n1× 1 and n2× 1 vectors of the dependent variable
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observations (the average retail petrol prices in a district, for each day and
brand type) in the left and right partitions, respectively; i is a vector of 1’s;
X1 and X2 are respectively n1×1 and n2×1 (left and right partition) matri-
ces of station density observations; Zj is an nj×4 matrix of control variables
for two partitions (with j = 1, 2 and the controls being: moving average of
the Rotterdam wholesale price adjusted for local differences, income, and
two dummies for brand types A and B); α is the price at the connection of
the two lines (corresponds to the intercept since X1 contains only negative
values after the transformation); β and γ are the slope coefficients for the
left and right partitions (X1 and X2, respectively); δj is the 4× 1 vector of
coefficients for Zj , j = 1, 2; and 1,2’s are the disturbances (assumed i.i.d.).
11
We allow for different effects of the Z control variables in different parti-
tions, by partitioning all the Z control variables according to the same kink
station density ζ¯. Our hypothesised relationship between the station density
and price is different for different partitions, but the model of section 5.3 is
silent about the effects of independent variables other than station density.
There is no reason to assume that the effect of, for example, marginal cost
on price is the same in the ranges of effective and “ineffective” competi-
tion, since in the latter part the pricing is driven by the kink feature of the
demand curve.
Given the empirical model in equation (5.8), our testable hypothesis is
H0 : β = γ. (5.9)
The data analysis shows that at any ζ¯, the right partition has a negative
relationship between the price and station density. If the data can identify
the part of the curve that is between ζ ′′ and ζ ′ in Figure 5.4, then our test
will reject the equality of slopes for the right and left partitions around
ζ¯ = ζ ′. Furthermore, the slope of the left partition should be positive.
We assume that the disturbances have a zero mean and are uncorrelated
with any of the regressors.
To cope with potential heteroscedasticity, we calculate the standard er-
rors using the White covariance matrix, such that our estimation and tests
are heteroscedasticity-robust.
11Our estimation and tests are robust to the exclusion of the Z controls. We do not
report the results here, but they can be obtained directly from the authors.
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5.4.3 Results
For all tested kink points ζ¯ ≤ 0.14, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal
slope coefficients in both partitions with at least 98% confidence. Further-
more, the slope in the left partition is positive and significant at a 1% level
for all kink points 0.105 < ζ¯ ≤ 0.135, and positive and significant at a 10%
level for all kinks ζ¯ ≤ 0.105 and at a 5% level for ζ¯ = 0.14. The model fits
equally well for all the tested kink points (R2 is slightly above 56%).
For large values of ζ¯, we cannot reject the null. Both slope coefficients
are negative and significant and cannot be said to differ. The F -statistics
and the associated p-values of the above tests for all ζ¯ are given in Table
C.1 in the appendix C.3.
Thus, we have shown that the relationship between station density and
prices is not monotonic. In particular, the relationship is positive for low
station density, and becomes negative after a certain kink point. We con-
clude that this turning station density is around ζ¯ = 0.135 (the highest
tested potential kink point to deliver positive and significant slope of the
left partition and still leave many observations to the left).
Finally, we fit the curve in equation (5.8) for ζ¯ = 0.135. The results
of the regression are given in table 5.1. To illustrate the relationship, we
picture the fitted price curve against station density in figure 5.5.
To summarise,
Result 5.1 The equilibrium pricing in the German petrol market is con-
sistent with Empirical Hypothesis 5.1 and Theorem 5.1: across the markets
with low station density, the equilibrium price is increasing with station den-
sity.
5.5 Conclusion
In this contribution we showed that increased competition may lead to higher
prices in a simple model of horizontal differentiation. We analysed especially
the comparative statics of the price-increasing behaviour and we argued that
it represents a rationalisable strategy of firms. This is supported empirically
in the retail petrol market in Germany.
We can rule out alternative explanations for this price-increasing be-
haviour, such as collusion, since we have seen both price-increasing and
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Table 5.1: Estimation results of equation (5.8) with ζ¯ = 0.135
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
station density≤ ζ¯ 0.1018∗∗ (0.012)
station density> ζ¯ −0.0079∗∗ (0.002)
marginal cost1 0.9651
∗∗ (0.008)
marginal cost2 0.9526
∗∗ (0.007)
income1 2·10−4∗∗ (0.000)
income2 2·10−4∗∗ (0.000)
A1 0.0197
∗∗ (0.001)
A2 0.0157
∗∗ (0.000)
B1 0.0131
∗∗ (0.001)
B2 0.0059
∗∗ (0.000)
Intercept 0.8861∗∗ (0.002)
N 14984
R2 0.566
F (10,14973) 2218.716
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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price-decreasing behaviour of the firms with respect to station density. The
firms in this market are typically large enough to be present in many mar-
kets; if they colluded, we would expect collusion to exist over the whole
range of station densities, but this is clearly not the case.
The set of markets in which this effect surfaces is, as usual, limited but
exists, as we have shown in the empirical section. The market needs to be
horizontally differentiated, it needs to have an outside option for all potential
buyers, and its expansion due to lower prices needs to be limited. A strictly
kinked demand curve, as in our simple example, is in fact not a necessary
prerequisite, as one can show for a family of locally smoothed-out demand
curves. Clearly also, this model is only powerful with restricted entry and
exit to the market, as we have for example in the short term examination
that is done in the empirical part of the paper.
The model is general enough in its description of consumers and pro-
ducers that it can also be applied to increased integration of international
producer-supplier markets, which occurs when improved communication
technologies and opening of the local markets reduce the perceived trans-
portation costs12 between previously distant agents. Take the product to
be an intermediate input, the two producers to be the suppliers of this in-
put, and the consumers as the manufacturers of a final good. As long as
this producer-supplier market fulfils the conditions described in the previ-
ous paragraph, one of the model’s predictions is that for a certain exogenous
fall in the perceived transportation costs (i.e., more world integration) the
manufacturers experience higher costs of intermediate inputs in the short
run.
From a competition policy point of view, for the relevant markets with
features as above, competition authorities need to consider this behaviour
when judging on market concentration as classical concentration measures
might be misleading, if they purely measure market share ratios of the par-
ticipating firms.
Furthermore, the firms’ strategy of ‘evading competition’ and accommo-
dating to a shared market even without explicit communication, needs to
be appreciated as a reasonable and profit maximizing strategy of players in
markets that seemed to follow the standard intuition about competition.
12These can include real transportation costs plus information costs, etc.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Data
Definition A.1 (Representative country) In a region where more than
one country is present and the two countries with the biggest trade with
Germany are similar in this measure, the country with the second largest
trade with Germany is called “representative country” on the grounds that
it is closer to the median country. If the country with the biggest trade with
Germany is too dominant, it is taken to be the representative country: e.g.,
Russia in CIS.
The qualitative results go in the same direction if the country with the
biggest trade with Germany is used.
Tables A.1 and A.2 present the summary statistics for the variables in
the regressions with all Bundesla¨nder and for Bundesla¨nder with finer trade
data, respectively.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
nu. immi (micro-census) 36 (90.581) 0 1104 809
nu. immi total 5987 (14873.609) 0 179426 809
nu. immi restricted 5449 (13588.605) 0 165072 809
share self-employed (Sjs) 0.134 (0.172) 0.008 1 809
share white collar (Sjw) 0.352 (0.171) 0 0.669 809
share blue collar (Sjb ) 0.513 (0.22) 0 0.822 809
Sjs · ln Immi 0.856 (0.77) 0.049 6.876 722
Sjw · ln Immi 2.692 (1.302) 0 6.45 722
Sj
b
· ln Immi 3.958 (1.915) 0 9.708 722
EU · Sjs · ln Immi 0.334 (0.552) 0 2.157 722
EU · Sjw · ln Immi 1.131 (1.805) 0 6.45 722
EU · Sj
b
· ln Immi 1.016 (1.783) 0 7.101 722
In millions of Euro:
export 1,970 (3,758) 0.311 28,811 782
GDP home country 1,786,329 (3,362,173) 6,562 15,299,542 782
GDP host Bundesland 254,066 (239,458) 41,098 862,711 841
distance (km) 2,594.134 (2,637.748) 0 9,861 841
EU 0.3 (0.458) 0 1 841
price level 58.96 (30.255) 15.926 121.585 782
A.1. DATA 127
Table A.2: Summary statistics for limited Bundesla¨nder and finer trade
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
nu. immi (micro-census) 51 (94.368) 0 750 270
nu. immi total 8430 (15524.2) 0 122138 270
nu. immi restricted 7732 (14206.655) 0 113288 270
share self-employed (Sjs) 0.088 (0.063) 0 0.283 270
share white collar (Sjw) 0.368 (0.162) 0.132 0.680 270
share blue collar (Sjb ) 0.545 (0.209) 0.175 0.838 270
Sjs · ln Immi 0.729 (0.513) 0 2.381 267
Sjw · ln Immi 3.003 (1.296) 0.924 6.098 267
Sj
b
· ln Immi 4.520 (1.969) 1.173 9.475 267
EU · Sjs · ln Immi 0.326 (0.546) 0 2.098 267
EU · Sjw · ln Immi 1.281 (1.968) 0 6.098 267
EU · Sj
b
· ln Immi 1.224 (2.08) 0 7.588 267
In millions of Euro:
export 2,588 (3,689) 8 25,411 270
GDP home country 1,768,272 (3,383,641) 6,562 15,299,542 270
GDP host Bundesland 301,679 (144,777) 133,607 548,536 270
distance (km) 2784.096 (2611.349) 0 9674 270
EU 0.333 (0.472) 0 1 270
price level 59.163 (29.882) 15.926 121.585 270
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Equilibrium under two symmetric countries
Assume that there are two countries i and j and the border between them lies
exactly at B = 12 . With a tariff t = 0, the result of this setup is familiar: each
company will set prices equal to pi = pj = rs = r. The consumer indifferent
between purchasing from country i or from country j lies directly at B = 12 ,
thus no trade occurs. Producer surplus in each country is PSi = PSj =
1
2r.
Consumer surplus in each country is CSi = CSj =
1
2a− 58r. Overall welfare
in both countries is then W = r + a− 54r = a− 14r.
Now a tariff t ≥ 0 is introduced. The following proposition then can be
derived.
Proposition B.1 With a tariff t, there can be at most one symmetric equi-
librium in pure strategies, with prices pi = pj = a− r2 .
Proof Assume that an asymmetric price equilibrium exists, such that coun-
try j exports into country i (see Fig.B.1(b)). Then the indifferent consumer
in country i is given by:
a− pi − rxˆ = a− pj − t− r(1− xˆ)
⇒ xˆ = 1
2
+
1
2r
(pj − pi + t), (B.1)
This leads to equilibrium prices being:
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pi = r +
t
3
pj = r − t
3
, (B.2)
which leads to the indifferent consumer outside country i with xˆ = 12+
1
6 · tr >
1/2, a contradiction.
Alternatively, consider a candidate for an asymmetric equilibrium de-
picted in solid lines in Fig.B.1(c). Prices are such that firms share the market
in half. Consider firm j’s incentives. It has at least one profitable deviation
from the solid price schedule (as shown by the dashed price schedule in
Fig.B.1(c)). Therefore, the solid price schedule cannot be an equilibrium.
The dashed price schedule cannot be an equilibrium, either, because firm i
would now want to deviate.
Thus, consider symmetric price schedules in solid lines in Fig.B.1(d).
Clearly, firm i has at least one profitable deviation (a dashed price schedule),
so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Consider price schedules depicted in solid lines in Fig.B.1(e): phi = a −
r
2 , i = 1, 2. This equilibrium corresponds to the collusive or monopoly
pricing outcome as it would also be obtained if the same firm offered its
product in both countries.1
This is an equilibrium if a deviation is not profitable. Increasing prices
would lead to a local monopoly outcome where some consumers in a country
would not be served, which has been ruled out to be profitable already with
free trade due to the assumption a ≥ 32r2. When firm j decreases its price,
the dashed line in Fig.B.1(e) represents the highest attainable profit. Firm
j’s price and profit in this case is:
p′j =
1
2
(
a+
r
2
− t), (B.3)
pi′j(pi = a−
r
2
, pj = p
′
j) =
1
8r
(
a+
r
2
− t)2, (B.4)
For the price p′j to be a successful deviation strategy for j, it needs to
1We thus label the equilibrium tc for collusive given a tariff.
2See Ivanov and Mu¨ller [2006] for detailed discussion on this assumption and the pos-
sibility of kink equilibria if it is relaxed.
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be by at least t smaller than pi = a− r2 because otherwise no consumer in i
will switch to consuming j. We can thus write:
1
2
(
a+
r
2
− t) ≤ a− r
2
− t, (B.5)
t ≥ a− 3
2
r, (B.6)
To confirm whether a deviation strategy is profitable for j, we thus have
to compare j’s deviation profit with the collusive profit. The collusive price
schedule (solid line) under tariff t yields:
pihj =
1
2
(
a− r
2
)
. (B.7)
As the deviation profit pi′j is strictly decreasing in t, we can analyze the
deviation strategy for the lowest possible t = a− 32r given that this a > 32r.
The deviation profit pi′j then becomes pi
′
j(t = a − 32r) = 12r. Requiring
deviation not to be profitable thus yields:
pihj > pi
′
j ⇒
a > 32r. (B.8)
Thus, for all a > 32r deviating from the collusive price schedule p
h
i =
phj = a− r2 is not profitable.
Introducing a tariff t ≥ a− 32r then results in no trade as in the situation
without a tariff. Consumer surplus in each country is CShi = CS
h
j =
1
8r.
Overall welfare in both countries then is W h = 14r + a − 12r = a − 14r.
Because all consumers are served and the average transportation cost does
not differ, overall welfare does not change relative to the situation without
a tariff. Yet the price in each country will increase to the collusive outcome
and thus surplus is redistributed from consumers to firms.
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i j
(a) Free trade, two countries
i
t
t
j
(b) Asymmetric prices
i
t
2 · t
j
(c) Asymmetric prices, no trade
i
t
j
(d) Tariff, two countries
i
t
t j
(e) Tariff equilibrium
Figure B.1: Free trade and tariff with two countries
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B.2 One large and two small countries - calcula-
tion of price equilibria
B.2.1 Collusive price equilibrium before FTA
The collusive equilibrium with symmetric tariffs yields the following:
phj = p
h
k = a−
1
2
r
phi =
1
2
a+
1
4
r +
1
2
t
⇒ xˆhjk =
1
2
⇒ xˆhij = xˆhik =
1
8
+
1
4
t
r
+
1
4
a
r
⇒ pihj = pihk =
(
11
8
− 1
4
t
r
− 1
4
a
r
)
·
(
a− 1
2
r
)
⇒ pihi =
1
r
·
(
1
2
a+
1
4
r +
1
2
t
)2
. (B.9)
Note that given a > 32r it holds that xˆ
h
ij >
1
2 +
1
4
t
r
> 12 .
There are three conditions that need to be met such that the collusive
equilibrium with trade between one large and two small countries exists.
A. B.1 (Trade condition) Equilibrium prices allow trade, i.e. especially i
imports from j and k respectively, i.e.
1
2
≤ xˆhij < B < 1
⇒ t < 4Br − 12r − a. (B.10)
A. B.2 (Consumer’s individual rationality) All consumers consume one of
the available products, especially the indifferent consumers in country i, i.e.
U(x = xˆhij , pj − t) = a− pj − t− rxˆhij > 0
⇒ t < 13a− 12r. (B.11)
A. B.3 Firms have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium and there
is no incentive to deviate to another price, i.e. especially a price lower than
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phj :
pij(p
h
j , p
h
k , p
h
i ) > pij(p
′
j , p
h
k , p
h
i )
⇒ 19a+ 2918r −
√
5201
44 r
2 + 704ar − 224a2 < t
< 19a+
29
18r +
√
5201
44 r
2 + 704ar − 224a2. (B.12)
Because of A.B.1 we known that a can not be too high, fact a ≤ 72r as
otherwise no positive t can fulfill the condition for any value of B. Inserting
a low a = 2r into the admissible range for t as given by A.B.3 yields −23.3 <
t < 26.9r. Thus in this case A.B.2 is binding and requires a t < 16r. Instead
also A.B.1 can be binding given B < 1324r. We conclude that a low a and a
sufficiently high B will always allow for a range of parameters t such that
the collusive equilibrium exists.
B.2.2 Competitive price equilibrium before FTA
Finding the prices plj = p
l
k < a− 12r that are below the collusive prices and
that can support an equilibrium requires solving the following firms’ profit
functions:
pij = pik =
1
2r
(pi − pj − t+ 2r) · pj
pii =
1
2r
(pj + pk − 2pi + 2t+ 2r) · pi
(B.13)
This yields:
plj = p
l
k =
5
3
r − 1
3
t
pli =
4
3
r +
1
3
t
⇒ xˆljk =
1
2
⇒ xˆlij = xˆlik =
2
3
+
1
6
t
r
. (B.14)
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The profits then are:
pilj = pi
l
k =
1
2r
(
5
3
r − 1
3
t
)2
pili =
1
r
·
(
4
3
r +
1
3
t
)2
. (B.15)
As in the situation of the collusive equilibrium, several conditions need
to me met such that the competitive price equilibrium is stable.
A. B.4 The competitive price needs to be below the collusive price, i.e.
plj < p
h
j
⇒ t > 132 r − 3a. (B.16)
A. B.5 (Trade condition) Equilibrium prices allow trade, i.e. especially i
imports from j and k respecively, i.e.
1
2
< xˆlij < B < 1
⇒ t < 6r (B − 23) . (B.17)
A. B.6 (Consumer’s individual rationality) All consumers consume one of
the available products, especially the indifferent consumers in country i, i.e.
U(x = xˆlij , pj − t) = a− pj − t− rxˆlij > 0
⇒ t < 2a− 4r. (B.18)
A. B.7 Firms have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium. We first
consider a deviation upwards by t by the firm in country j . This would yield
the potentially highest profit for an upwards deviation which is:
pij(p
l
j + t, p
l
k, p
l
i) =
1
18
(
25r − 10t− 8 t2
r
)
< pij(p
l
j , p
l
k, p
l
i). (B.19)
Deviating upwards by t yields a profit below the competitive equilibrium profit
and thus a deviation is never profitable. We therefore also check a deviation
downwards and find:
p∗j(p
l
k, p
l
i) =
5
4r − 12t
⇒ pij(p∗j , plk, pli) = 2516r − 108 t+ 14 t
2
r
. (B.20)
136 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
To uphold the equilibrium, the resulting profit needs to be lower than the
profit in the competitive equilibrium and thus:
t >
(
2− 6
√
2
5
)
r. (B.21)
We conclude that the competitive equilibrium exists only for values of
t that are larger than the values stated in condition.B.4 and condition.B.7
as well as smaller than the values given by condition.B.5 and condition.B.6.
A common range of values for all the conditions exists for B > 23 and
a > 15+4
√
2
10 r, i.e. when the countries are sufficiently asymmetric in size and
consumer valuation of the good high enough.
For a ∈
(
15+4
√
2
10 r,
7
2r
)
and B ∈ (23 , 1), both the collusive and the com-
petitive equilibrium exist. The collusive equilibrium then yields higher prof-
its given any a < 236 r − 23 t.3
B.2.3 Price equilibrium after FTA
Abolishing the tariff tjk induces competition between countries j and k and
will thus generally reduce prices. Reducing prices pj and pk is expected to
lead to more imports from the small countries j and k into i. Thus we solve:
pij = pik =
1
2r
(pk + pi − 2pj − t+ 2r) · pj
pii =
1
2r
(pj + pk − 2pi + 2t+ 2r) · pi
Equilibrium prices then are:
paj = p
a
k = r −
1
5
t
pai = r +
2
5
t
⇒ xˆajk =
1
2
⇒ xˆaij = xˆik =
1
2
+
1
5
t
r
(B.22)
3And consequently for any t < 5r.
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and the profits are:
piaj = pi
a
k =
1
r
(
r − 1
5
t
)2
piai =
1
r
(
r +
2
5
t
)2
(B.23)
By comparing with Appendices B.2.1 and B.2.2, one can readily observe
that xˆaij < xˆ
h
ij and for t < 5r also xˆ
a
ij < xˆ
l
ij . Thus, there are more imports
from the small countries j and k into i. Thus, when conditions A.B.1, A.B.2,
A.B.5 and A.B.6 are fullfilled, also the FTA equilibrium exists.
The comparison between the FTA equilibrium and the pre-FT competi-
tive equilibrium yields similar results as the comparison to the pre-FTA col-
lusive equilibrium: Prices decrease and imports M into country i increase.
Fig.B.2 depicts the two equilibria.
a
pi pj = pk
M
jBi
t
t
k1/2
t
1/2
(a) Competitive tariff (pre-FTA) equilibrium
a
pˆi < pi pˆj = pˆk < pj
Mˆ > M
jBi
t
t
k1/2 1/2
(b) Post-i/j-FTA equilibrium
Figure B.2: Pre-FTA and post-FTA equilibria with two small and one large
country
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Table B.1: Cross-market price correlations for selected car
models and geographical markets. The models have been
selected to have been in the European car market for the
longest possible period of time (in the boundaries of 1970-
1999), and to represent different European car producers.
Belgium France Germany Italy UK
1. VW Golf
Belgium 1
France 0.98 1
Germany 0.99 0.98 1
Italy 0.97 0.97 0.98 1
UK 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.98 1
2. Opel Astra
Belgium 1
France 0.95 1
Germany 0.98 0.95 1
Italy 0.89 0.93 0.91 1
UK 0.8 0.78 0.77 0.85 1
3. Renault Clio
Belgium 1
France 0.99 1
Germany 0.98 0.98 1
Italy 0.92 0.94 0.96 1
UK 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.96 1
4. Opel Corsa
Belgium 1
France 0.95 1
Germany 0.98 0.95 1
Italy 0.89 0.93 0.91 1
UK 0.8 0.78 0.77 0.85 1
5. VW Polo
Belgium 1
France 0.96 1
Germany 0.99 0.95 1
Continued on next page...
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... table B.1 continued
Belgium France Germany Italy UK
Italy 0.93 0.93 0.93 1
UK 0.91 0.9 0.92 0.97 1
6. Ford Fiesta
Belgium 1
France 0.96 1
Germany 0.98 0.97 1
Italy 0.92 0.97 0.95 1
UK 0.83 0.9 0.85 0.91 1
7. BMW 3er
Belgium 1
France 0.98 1
Germany 0.99 0.99 1
Italy 0.96 0.96 0.97 1
UK 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.97 1
8. VW Passat
Belgium 1
France 0.99 1
Germany 0.99 0.98 1
Italy 0.95 0.95 0.94 1
UK 0.94 0.9 0.92 0.92 1
9. Peugeot 306
Belgium 1
France 0.97 1
Germany 0.96 0.94 1
Italy 0.94 0.93 0.94 1
UK 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.91 1
10. Fiat Bravo
Belgium 1
France 0.93 1
Germany 0.97 0.96 1
Italy 0.9 0.95 0.91 1
UK 0.8 0.88 0.81 0.94 1
140 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 5
C.1 Derivation of equilibria
The model we use can be thought as an adaptation of Salop [1979]. The
market is given by a Salop circle of circumference 2 · s. Each point on the
circle represents a differentiated good that is most preferred by a consumer
occupying that point. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the circle,
with density 1/s, which results in a constant consumer mass of 2. There are
two identical firms, positioned exactly opposite each other at 0 and s. Like
Salop [1979], we are interested in the analysis of the short term behaviour in
the pricing game and thus we also assume that the firms’ positions are fixed
exogenously. We normalise marginal costs of production to zero. When
a consumer x consumes a good offered at y 6= x, he incurs a disutility or
transportation cost, t · |x− y|, according to the shortest arc-length distance
between x and y. Consumption of either good delivers to the consumer a
pure utility of a > 0 in monetary terms, which is then adjusted for the price
paid and the transportation cost.
For simplicity, we cut the market in half.
C.1.1 Hinterland
Earlier work was concerned with the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria
in similar Hotelling settings. We choose our set-up in a simple way, such
that typical problems pertaining to pure strategies1 do not occur, in order
1E.g., jumps in demand due to undercutting the rival’s price, leading to non-existence
of pure strategy equilibria.
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to allow for clear presentation of our case. This relates to the amount of
firms and their symmetric position, given which, it is impossible to obtain
the hinterland of your competitor. Take firm i, which prices such that the
consumer at location of its rival, −i, just prefers −i to i. Lowering its price
by a small amount, firm i does not gain all of the consumers on the other
side of −i, because it has already been serving those consumers from the
other side of the circle. The hinterland does not exist.
C.1.2 Profit and demand regions
Firms set prices pi ∈ [0, a]—a compact, convex set. The lower bound is the
marginal cost, normalised to zero for simplicity of exposition. Setting any
price equal to or above a would lead to demand of zero for firm i. Therefore,
we establish the upper bound a on the price set. Relaxing this assumption
does not change the results.
Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) =

[0] 0
(
(pi ≥ p−i + st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a− st)
)
∨(pi ≥ a)
[1] a−pi
st
· pi (2a− p−i − st ≤ pi ≤ a)
∧(p−i ≥ a− st)
[2]
[
1
2 +
1
2st(p−i − pi)
] · pi (p−i − st ≤ pi ≤ 2a− p−i − st)
∧(p−i ≤ a)
[3] pi
(
(pi ≤ p−i − st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a)
)
∨((pi ≤ a− st) ∧ (p−i ≥ a))
(C.1)
The piece-wise linear parts of the demand can be associated with regions
of demand patterns, as described below.2
[0] Demand is zero if a firm prices higher than the price of its competitor
at the firm’s location
(
(pi ≥ p−i + st)∧ (p−i ≤ a− st)
)
or too high for
all consumers at (pi = a)
2An example for the demand for firm i’s product depending on its price pi is shown in
figure C.1.
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[1] The first interesting part of demand corresponds to firm i being a local
monopolist. A small decrease in price leads to engaging previously idle
consumers in trade; a small increase leads to him losing customers to
the outside option.
[1]-[2] The kink between parts [1] and [2]. If the firm lowers its price, it
steals the customers from the competitor; if it increases its price, some
customers switch to the outside option—not to the competitor.
[2] This part corresponds to competitors being in “effective” competition:
the market is covered, and any change in prices leads to stealing con-
sumers from—or driving your consumers to—the competitor. This
occurs for prices pi ∈ (p−i − st, 2a− p−i − st).
[3] This part corresponds to firm i capturing the whole market, which
occurs at prices pi < p−i− st, or pi < a− st if firm −i prices itself out
of the market.
Of course, depending on the competitor’s price p−i and the parameters
a, s, and t, some of these regions may not exist at all:
• If there is no competitor (or p−i > a), then part [2] collapses.
• If p−i < a− st (low enough) and st > a, there is no part [1]: even for
very high pi firm i would “effectively” compete with firm −i.
• If p−i < st or st > a, there is no (profitable) part [3]: even for very
small pi > 0 firm i cannot capture the whole market from firm −i,
either because firm −i prices too low or the transport across the whole
market is too expensive.
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Ui(x) U−i(x)
x
0.6 s = 1
a = 1
0.7
0.3
0
a = 1
0.5
0.2
[pi = 0]
[pi = 0.3]
[pi = 0.7]
[pi = 1]
[0] [1] [2] [3]
Figure C.1: Example consumer utility levels for different prices pi with fixed
parameters p−i = 0.8, a = 1, t = 0.5 and s = 1
C.1.3 Best response
pi(p−i|a, s, t) =

GM a− st (p−i ≥ a) ∧ (st ≤ a2 )
CM p−i − st (p−i ≤ a) ∧ (p−i ≥ 3st)
EC st+p−i2 (p−i ≤ 3st) ∧ (p−i ≤ 43a− st)
IC 2a− st− p−i (p−i ≤ 32a− st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a) ∧ (p−i ≥ 43a− st)
LM a2 (st ≥ a2 ) ∧ (p−i ≥ 32a− st)
(C.2)
C.2 Reference cases
We compare the equilibrium price of our duopoly game to two reference
cases: A one-product monopoly and a two-product monopoly.
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C.2.1 One-product monopoly
One way to look at one-product monopoly is to fix the price of firm −i
in the duopoly profit equation (5.5) so as to price it out of the market:
p−i = pˆ−i > a. Then, the regions [0] and [2] will disappear from the demand
function (for prices 0 < pi < a), and we are left with
ΠMi (pi|a, s, t) =

[1]
a−pi
st
· pi pi > a− st
[3] pi pi ≤ a− st
(C.3)
Solving the maximisation problem for the monopoly, we get the equilib-
rium prices as
pM∗ =

a− st if st ≤
a
2
a
2 if
a
2 < st
(C.4)
C.2.2 Two-product monopoly
The two-product monopoly can be computed in the same framework, as one
firm setting prices pi and p−i simultaneously. The firm will use symmetric
prices as, without fixed cost for the second product, it is always better to
supply the upper half of the market line with the product located at the
upper end than to supply it from the lower end of the market and vice
versa. This leaves more utility with the consumers, which can be extracted
through higher prices. Thus we get the symmetric prices pi = p−i and the
profit is given by
Π2Mi (pi|a, s, t) =

[1]
a−pi
st
· 2 · pi pi > a− st2
[3] pi pi ≤ a− st2
(C.5)
Solving for the equilibrium prices yields
p∗2M =

a−
st
2 if st < a
a
2 if a ≤ st
(C.6)
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C.3 Chow Test results
Table C.1: The F -statistic and the associated p-values for the Chow test for
the parameter stability at different ζ¯’s
increment F p R2
.25 2.218132 .136419 .5654151
.245 2.094088 .1478908 .5654117
.24 2.280698 .131014 .564586
.235 2.1578 .1418687 .5645825
.23 2.038049 .1534272 .564579
.225 1.921477 .1657146 .5645757
.22 2.729819 .0985114 .5672181
.215 2.879594 .0897294 .5672224
.21 2.79763 .0944247 .5656854
.205 1.596892 .2063639 .5622169
.2 1.499953 .2206978 .5622142
.195 .1695287 .6805369 .56202
.19 .0887485 .7657784 .5620067
.185 .0685921 .7934014 .5620061
.18 1.978202 .1596008 .5626864
.175 2.476331 .1155927 .5624058
.17 2.615331 .1058565 .562429
.165 2.786674 .0950722 .5624336
.16 3.745212 .0529778 .5608998
.155 2.042018 .1530274 .5609509
.15 5.64495 .0175182 .5626013
.145 2.282735 .1308421 .5620812
.14 9.525839 .0020297 .5621582
.135 79.31693 5.89e-19 .5661687
.13 82.42374 1.23e-19 .5652712
.125 53.00962 3.48e-13 .5628271
.12 52.13296 5.44e-13 .5628073
.115 40.56149 1.96e-10 .5638012
.11 12.34939 .0004424 .5638718
.105 6.764859 .0093062 .563678
.1 6.484803 .01089 .5636718
.095 6.206994 .0127354 .5636657
.09 15.73746 .0000731 .5644021
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